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LOCKUPS AND DELAWARE VENUE IN CORPORATE 
LA\V A1�D BANKRUPTCY 
David A. Skeel, Jr. • 
Two of the most hotly contested corporate law issues in recent years 
have been the use of "lockup" provisions in takeovers and the question 
whether state competition to attract corporate charters is desirable, 
because it leads to a "race to the top," or pernicious, because ic induces 
a "race to the bottom." The debate over lockups, which are provisions 
granted by a target that promise to compensate a bidder if their 
proposed sale falls through, 1 dates back to the rise of the takeover 
market in the mid 1980s. The charter competition debate goes back 
much further, although the current exchange was launched by vVilliam 
Cary's 1974 article sharply criticizing Delaware's preeminence in 
corporate law. 2 Both debates have inspired significant new 
contributions in the past year and neither shows any signs of subsiding. 
Although each of these issues is distinctively corporate in nature, both 
have provoked similarly heated debate in bankruptcy. In the past 
decade, increasing use of lockup provisions by corporate debtors and 
Delaware's new status as a favorite filing location for large corporate 
debtors have become two of the most controversial issues in bankruptcy 
practice and theory. The remarkable correlation between the concerns 
of corporate law and those of corporate bankruptcy is no accident. 
Rather than being somehow unrelated, corporate bankruptcy is an 
obvious extension of corporate law, and until the late 1930s, the t\vo 
were treated as closely connected. Congress severed the connections by 
enacting sweeping reforms that ushered Wall Street bankers and lawyers 
out of corporate bankruptcy in 1938.3 The decades that followed can 
� Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Lynn LoPucki, Bob Rasmussen, 
Vice Chancellor Leo S trine and the participants in this symposium for helpful comments on an earliet· 
drafc. 
I. Like other academic commentators, I use the term "lockup" broadly, to include any termination 
fee, stock option or option to purchase as�ets granted by the target firm to a bidder in connection with a 
proposed merger or tender offer. Courts and lawyers sometimes distinguish termination (or breakup) fees, 
on the one hand, from sr.ock and asset options, on the other, and refer to only the Iauer as lockups. 
2. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Rifl£ctions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 
(19H). 
3. Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, the Wall Street investment bankers who had underwritten 
a corporate debtor's securities, together with the bankers' attorneys, played a central role in any large scale 
corporate reorganization. The Chandler Act's new reorganization provision�, which were drafted by future 
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas and his staff at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
dramatically altered the existing regime by mandating that the managers of a corpor.:tte debtor be replaced 
by an independent trustee. The Chandler Act also prohibited the debtor's current bankers and lawyers 
fmrn serving as trustee or trustee's counsel. Because of these and other strictures, Wall Street quickly 
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be viewed as a slow process of restoring the prior links, and Delaware's 
sudden emergence as the leading bankruptcy court, together with the 
prol iferation of lockups and other takeover devices in bankruptcy, 
illustrates just how far the process has come. For large firms, corporate 
bankruptcy now looks a great deal like corporate law. 
Although the history is important ,  my goal in this Anicle is to 
c.dvance the normative debate on the two issues I have mentioned­
lockups and state competition for corporate charters. The first half of 
the Article weighs in on the role of lockup provisions. Corporate lav .. · 
commentators have adopted wide ly divergent views of the propriety of 
lockups, \'vrith severa l calling for courts to uphold all lockups and others 
proposing varying levels and kinds of scrutiny .4 To make sense of this 
debate, I show that the existing literature can be distilled to three central 
issues : l) commentators' differing views on the larger corporate law 
controversy over managers' proper response to unsolicited takeover bids; 
2) their views as to whether target managers can or will prove disloyal 
to shareholders' interests; and 3) their assumptions about the 
appropriate size oflockups-that is, how much compensation should be 
allowed. In describing the importance of these three issues, I develop 
and defend my own normative position. Because lockups can entice 
managers to accede to a change in control they might otherwise resist, 
I argue that courts should enforce both first and second bidder lockups. 
Courts should limit lockup bidders to their reliance interest, however, 
rather than allowing even larger lockups. 5 
Inter estingly, the Delaware case law on lockups has evolved in a 
direction quite similar to the normative approach I defend. In an 
important recent case, Brazen v. Bell Atlantic,6 the Delaware Supreme 
Court analyzed the lockup in question in contractual terms, and 
outlined a reliance-like framework for scrutinizing future lockups. I 
argue that Brazen can and should serve as the touchstone for the next 
iteration of Delaware lockup jurisprudence. 
disappeared from the corporate rcorgani:Lation process. I discuss these developments at length in a book 
manuscript and several articles. See David A. Skeei,Jr., The Rise and Dominion ofBankruptcy in America 
(unpublished manuscript, 1999); David A. Skeci,Jr., Vern Countryman and lht PaJiz of Progrc.rsive ((!Jid Populi.rt) 
BanA:ruptcy Scholarship, l 13 HAR Y. L. REV. I 07 S (2000); David A. Skeel,] r., An Evolutionary Theory ofCorpomiL 
Law n.nd Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325 (1998). 
+. Steve Fraidin andjon Hanson have taken the position that courts should always enforce lockups. 
See Stephen Fraidin &Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE LJ. 1739, 1743 ( 1994). Thcir 
view and the debate as a whole are described in detail in Part !(A), infta. 
5. I introduced the reliance damages perspective on lockups in David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance 
Damage.r Approach to Corpom!L Lockups, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 564 (1996). Although my views have changed on 
some of the details, as will become clear in Part I, the lockup analysis in this Article should be seen as an 
extension and refinement of the earlier approach. 
6. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997). 
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I conclude the lockup analysis by considering the role of lockup 
provisions in bankruptcy. Although many courts and commentators 
have contended that bankruptcy calls for an entirely different approach 
to lockups, I argue that the extensive similarities between the two 
contexts suggest that courts should also apply a reliance-based approach 
in bankruptcy-though the approach should be tailored to reflect the 
nature of the bankruptcy decision making process. 
The second half of the Article considers the longstanding state law 
charter competition debate. The analysis begins by describing the two 
traditional views: "race to the bottom" theorists insist that Delaware 
and other states cater to managers at the expense of shareholders, 
whereas "race to the top" theorists contend that market forces impel 
managers and states to take shareholder interests into account. 7 Much 
of the most recent literature leans toward the race to the top view, but 
concludes that Delaware's dominance enables it to favor local interests 
such as the Delaware bar. In assessing the literature, I emphasize the 
moral dimension in the Delaware case law, and show that many of the 
rules that benefit Delaware lawyers also further Delaware's role as moral 
arbiter in corporate law. 
Turning to corporate bankruptcy, I argue that Delaware's 
increasingly prominent role in bankruptcy offers many of the same 
benefits as its preeminence in state corporate law. Because corporate 
bankruptcy is regulated by Congress rather than the states, the analogy 
is far from perfect. But the similarities make clear that the recent 
campaign to prohibit large corporate debtors from filing for bankruptcy 
in Delaware is misguided. Several recent commentators have 
challenged an earlier article of mine that defended Delaware's 
popularity as a bankruptcy forum.8 I conclude by pointing out the 
problems in their critique. 
I. LOCKUPS 
As noted above, lockup arrangements take a variety of forms, 
including termination or breakup fees, stock options, and options to 
purchase specified assets. Lockups have long been an important feature 
7. vVilliam Cary introduced the "race to the bottom" view, as noted above. Cal)', suj;ra note 2, 
Ralph Winter's response to Cary initiated the "race to the top" literature. Ralph K, \Vinter,J r,, Swte Law, 
Shareholder Protecliun, and tJze 7/uory of/Jze Corporalwn, 6J LEGAL STUD, 251 (1977), The d ebate is described 
in detail in Pan Il(A), infra, 
8, See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M, LoPucki, Shopping for Judges,' An Empirical Ana{ysis of Venue 
Choice in Large Chapter I I Reorgani;;,aLinns, 84 CORNELL L REv. 967,972-73, 993-94,996-97 (1999). The 
article Eisenberg and LoPucki respond to is David A, Skeei,J r., Bankruptcy Judges and Banbuj!lcy Venue,' Sum< 
Thoughts on Delmvare, I DeL L Rev, I (1998), 
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of corporate acquisitions. As corporate law devices such as auctions and 
sales of assets have made their way into corporate bankruptcy, lockups 
have become increasingly important in this context as well.9 i\.lthough 
there are crucial differences, as we shall see, lockups are criticized and 
praised in very similar terms in the two contexts. Both in corporate law 
and in bankruptcy, court.s and commentators \NOrry that lockups \vii! be 
used to further managers' imerests at the expense of shareholders , or for 
other inappropriate purposes. Lockup advocates, by contrast, extol 
lockups as a device that helps· firms to obtain higher prices for their 
assets in an auction or negotiated sale. 
The analysis that follows explores the literature and case law on 
lockups in some detail. The analysis begins in corporate law, ·with the 
vibrant academic debate over the propriety of corporate lockups. After 
summarizing the new and previous literature and identifying the three 
issues that lie at the heart of the debate, I develop a reliance damages­
based theory for determining whether and when lockups should be 
permitted. I then turn to the most recent Delaware lockup cases. 
Interestingly, the Delaware cases have taken an increasing interest in 
precisely the kinds of contractual considerations that my theory 
identifies. 
The remainder of the part focuses on lockups in the bankruptcy 
context. As in the initial section, the bankruptcy analysis looks first at 
the existing literature, then turns to the most recent bankruptcy cases. 
A.  The Lockup Debate in Corporate Law Theory 
The leading early articles on lockups emerged in connection with the 
literature on hostile takeovers, and reflected commentators' pervasive 
concerns about managers' resistance to takeover bids.10 The concern 
was (and is) quite simple. In the face of an unwanted takeover bid, the 
managers of the target frequently look for an alte.::native bidder, a 
"white knight" who may implicitly commit to protecting the managers' 
policies and jobs. Although the white knight strategy sometimes inspires 
a bidding contest and obtains a higher price for the target's 
shareholders, the target's managers can use a lockup both to chill the 
9. Bankruptcy's reorganization provisions arc set forth in Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code. II 
U.S.C. §§ I I  01-1174 (1994). Chapter 7 provides the framework for liquidating a corporation. I I  U.S. C. 
§§ 701-766 (1994). Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S. C.§§ I 0 1-1330 ( 1994) will be cited hereafter 
as "B�mkruptcy Code§ _." 
. I 0. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, £,c/usi1•e Aierger AgrwnenLr and Lnck-ups in Negotiated CorjJoraiLAcquisili.ons, 
7 S lvliNC\. L. Rr.v. 239, 3 23-3 2 (1990); Jennifer ].Johnson & Mary Siegel, CorjJorate Mergers: Redtjining lf.e 
Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 3 77-78 (1987). 
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bidding and to assure that the vvhite knight wins.11 By agreeing to pay 
a large termination fee or to sell stock or important assets at a below 
market price if the white knight loses, the target's managers can reduce 
the target firm's value for an umvanted bidder. Target managers can 
usc the same strategy even in the absence of a hostile bidder. vVhen a 
target [J.rm enters into a consensual merger agreement with a friendly 
bidder, its managers may grant a lockup in order to discourage any 
would-be hostile bidders from interfering with the friendly arrangement . 
Thus, target managers can use lockups to fend off both actual and 
hypothetical hostile bidders. 
The most obvious way to prevent managers from using lockups to 
discourage unwanted bidders would be to prohibit them altogether. But 
lockup arrangements are not always pernicious. In addition to serving 
as a defensive mechanism, lockups also can be used for such benign 
purposes as enticing a bidder to increase its bid. 
The initial lockup articles searched for ways to permit beneficial 
lockups while prohibiting the malignant ones. The most prominent 
suggestion came from Stephen Bainbridge, who proposed a bright line 
test: courts should strike down any lockup that was worth more than ten 
percent of the target firm's value, but uphold any lockup in a lesser 
amount.12 Two other commentators argued that lockups should be 
subject to a vote by the target's shareholders.13 
The second generation of lockup analysis was inspired by a simple but 
elegant insight by Ian Ayres. Although courts and commentators 
previously had assumed that lockups affected only the unfortunate, 
"locked out" bidder, Ayres showed that lockups have precisely the same 
effect on the favored, "lockup" bidder. 14 Lockups reduce the amount 
both bidders are willing to bid, and therefore will not ordinarily affect 
which bidder wins a bidding contest. 15 
Consider a simple illustration. Assume that Friendly bidder values 
the Target at $675,000, while Hostile would be willing to pay as much 
as $700,000. IfTarget's managers gave Friendly a $75,000 lockup in 
return for a bid of $600,000, the lockup would reduce the value of 
Target to Hostile by $75,000, since this amount would be paid to 
Friendly in the event that Hostile won the bidding. Thus, Hostile would 
11. The "poster child" for these concerns ,,·as Rev/on, Inc. v. ivfacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., .506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1936), a Delaware Supreme Coun decision that condemned the elions of a target's board 
to favor a "·hitc knight. 
12. See Bainbridge, rupra note 10, at 327-32. 
13. Seejohnson&Siegc!,Jupranote IO,at+l1-!3. 
14. bn Ayres, Ana!J'zing Stock Lock-ups: Do Target TmLrury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate T akover Auctions-', 
90 COLU�t. L. REV. 682,68.5-94 (1990). 
1.5. See id. at 69.5. 
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refuse to pay more than $625,000 for Target.16 Yet the lockup would 
also lower Friendly's reservation price by$ 7 5,000. Because the lockup 
assures Friendly a $ 7 5,000 profit if another bidder wins, Friendly would 
rather lose the bidding than pay more than $600,000, the bid that would 
assure Friendly the same $75,000 profit. As a resuh, Hostile would 
acquire Target by bidding slightly more than S600,000. Even \Vith the 
lockup, the highest valuing bidder would still \vin. 
Although lockups generally should not alter the outcome of a bidding 
contest, Ayres identified one important exception to this rule. A lockup 
that promises the lockup bidder more than its expected profit (a 
"foreclosing" lockup, in Ayres' terminology), can enable a lower valuing 
bidder to outbid a superior bidder. 17 IfTarget's managers gave Friendly 
a $125,000 lockup in return for a $600,000 bid, for instance, the lockup 
would stymie Hostile. In the face of the $125,000 obligation, Hostile 
would not be willing to pay more than $5 75,000 for Target. Friendly 
would therefore win the bidding at $600,000, even though Hostile was 
the higher valuing bidder. Based on this concern, Ayres concluded that 
courts should invalidate foreclosing lockups, but uphold lockups in every 
other circumstance.18 
Starting from Ayres' insight that lockups are not nearly so pernicious 
as often thought, Fraidin and Hanson pushed this perspective to its 
logical conclusion. Even a so-called "foreclosing" lockup, they pointed 
out, might not actually prevent the superior bidder from winning.19 If 
Hostile valued Target at $750,000, for instance, it would outbid 
Friendly even in the face of Friendly's $600,000 bid and $125,000 
lockup by making a bid of slightly more than $725,000. More 
importantly, the Coase theorem suggests that, no matter who won the 
initial bidding, the higher valuing bidder could eventually \vind up with 
Target. If Friendly won the bidding, but Target was more valuable to 
Hostile, Hostile would strike a deal with Friendly to acquire Target 
through a post auction sale.20 According to this re3.soning, lockups will 
never interfere with the allocationally efficient disposition of the target's 
16. A bid of S625,000, plus the obligation to pay Friendly 575,000 if Friend ly l o s t  the bidding, 
would total 5700,000, which is Hostile's "reservation price." If Hostile paid any more than this, it would 
lose money on the transaction. 
1 7. See Ayres, supra note 14, at 699-700. 
18. !d. a t 704. Although subsequent commentators h:we assumed that foreclosin g lockups arc rare, 
John Coates and Guhan Subramanian point out in a new article that lockups may often prove foreclosing, 
due to the relatively low profi ts bidders receive in many transactions. John C. Coates & Guhan 
Subr-amanian, A B'9'-Si.de /o.Jodtl of LnckufJS: Thtory m1d Ewlma, STAN. L. REV. (lcJrthcoming 2000). 
19. Fraidin & Hanson, JUjJTfl note 4, at I 774-75. 
20. See Ul. a t 1788-94; id. at 1789 ("This portion of our analysis of lockups replicates the basic lesson 
of the Coase Theorem, which holds that so long as contracting co5lS are not prohibitive, parties will 
conu·act to the same all oca t ion of resources no matter the legal rule and no matter their initial a l l ocation.") 
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assets. Given that "lockups, like chicken soup, can't hurt but may well 
help," Fraidin and Hanson proclaimed that courts should uphold nearly 
every lockup.21 
In response to this paean to lockups, several commentators pointed 
out flaws in Fraidin and Hanson's reasoning and offered alternative 
approaches that comprise the third (and current) generation of lockup 
c..nalysis.'I'I An earlier article of mine questioned Fraidin and Hanson's 
Coasian assumption that the highest valuing bidder would always end 
up '>Vith the target. Because bargaining can break down for a variety of 
reasons, bidders will not always transact around an excessive lockup that 
gives a lower valuing bidder control of the target firm. 23 Rather than 
simply upholding all lockups, I argued that courts should analyze lockup 
arrangements in contractual terms. Although lockups resemble 
liquidated damages provisions in crucial respects, the contractual 
analysis suggests that courts should rarely if ever award expectation 
damages, as they do with other liquidated damages provisions. For 
several reasons, including the absence of specific, alternative 
opportunities for most bidders and risk of target manager disloyalty, 
courts should limit lockup bidders to their reliance damages.24 
vVhereas my article emphasized the effects of a lockup on post-lockup 
events, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner pointed out that lockups 
can influence whether a higher valuing bidder enters the bidding in the 
first instance. If a higher valuing bidder's costs are as high as its 
expected profits in a bidding contest, for instance, it will stay out of the 
bidding altogether unless the target managers subsidize the higher 
bidder's entry by granting it a lockup.25 Because lockups can influence 
who does or does not make a bid, an obvious concern is that target 
managers will use lockups to discourage unwanted bidders and dampen 
the market for corporate control. In order to limit the pernicious effects 
of lockups, Kahan and Klausner proposed to distinguish among three 
different types of lockup. In their view, courts should closely scrutinize 
both "anticipatory" lockups-lockups granted to a favored bidder in 
anticipation of a bid from an unwanted bidder- and "second bidder" 
21. !d. at 1745. 
22. This depends on how one counts "generations." Although ltreatthe most recent contributions 
to the literature as part of the third generation, they could also be seen as a new, fourth wave. 
23. See Skeel , supra note 5, at 580-S<L 
24. See iil. at 595-60 I. I develop this analysis further in Pan I(A)(3), infra. 
2S. See �hrccl Kahan & ?vfichacl Klausner, Lnc!rups and th.e i\.1arket.for Corporal" Cvnlrol, 48 STA:". L. 
REV. I S39, I S48-49 (1996). Kahan and Klausner illustrate this point numerically. If one bidder values 
the tJ.rget at S780 million, a second, higher valuing bidder who expects to incur $30 million in bidding costs 
will not bid unless it values the firm at more than $810 million-- enough to cover its expected costs. See id. 
at !.'AS. 
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lockups-lockups used to induce a second bidder to enter the bidding 
after an unwanted bidder has already commenced the bidding.26 Only 
"nonanticipatory first bidder" lockups, which target managers give to a 
bidder in the absence of any evidence of a second, unwamed bidder, 
should be subject to more deferential revie·w under the business 
judgment rule.�7 
Two recent contributions to the lockup debate have ofTered additional 
support forth� conclusions I and Kahan and Klausner reached several 
years ago. A nev·l, doctrinally oriented article contends, as did my 
earlier analysis, that courts should give greater attention to the 
contractual nature oflockups and reaches similar conclusions. Dra,ving 
on contract and trust law doctrines that decline to enforce contractual 
expectations under some circumstances, but award reliance damages to 
parties that had no reason to know the contract was unenforceable, the 
article contends that courts should adopt a similar approach to 
lockups-an approach that considers the lockup bidder's contractual 
rights, rather than just the target manager's fiduciary duties. 2H Another 
new article uses auction theory to defend the distinction-first 
emphasized by Kahan and Klausner--between first and second bidder 
lockups. Based on the assumption that auctions reduce the profits of an 
initial takeover bidder and thus undermine their incentive to search for 
attractive targets, this article concludes that first bidder lockups (which 
discourage auctions) should be permitted, but courts should prohibit 
second bidder lockups (which create auctions).29 
26 . See id. at 1564-65 (" [S]econd-bidder and anticipatory lockups warrant close judicial scrutiny.") . 
27. Seeid. atl565. 
28. Paul L. Regan, Great Ecpectal.ion.s' A Contract Law Ana!Jsir for Preclusive Corporal.i: Lflckups, 2 1  
CARDOZO L .  REV. l (1999). Regan argues that courts should consider four factors when determining 
whether to enforce a lockup: l) whether the lockup bidder knew or should have known that the target 
managers breached their fiduciary duty in connection with the proposed agreement; 2) whether the 
agreement lud already been performed or was wholly executory; 3) whether any fairness concerns 
implicated by target managers' breach are based on strong policy commitments; 4) whether reliance 
damages are available in the event the lockup bidder is an innocent party. A..lthough his exploration of 
contract and trust bw provides doctrinal support for a reliance-based approach, Regan's analysis differs 
from my reliance theory in its greater willingness to invalidate lockups altogether-that is, to deny a lockup 
bidder even its reliance interest. Regan's analysis also has several limitations as a source of doctrinal 
guidance. First, the fiduciary duty inquiry in the first and third factors is somewhat circular: it may not 
be clear whether the target board has breached its fiduciary duty or not, or how strong the fairness concern 
is, until the Delaware Chancery Court has assessed the board's performance. This, of course, is precisely 
the assessment that the four factors are intended to in Corm. Second, most of the contract and trust doctrines 
Regan identifies, such as courts' unwillingness to enforce contracts made with an underage or incompetent 
promisor, arc narrow exceptions to a gennal policy of enforcement. The general enforceability of lockups, 
b)· contrast, is much more in question. 
29. Kermit Roosevelt, Und.erstmrding Lflckups: EJJects in Ba11krupt.cy and !he Afarhtjor CorjHmz/c Control, 17 
Y,\LEJ Oi': Rl::GUL. 93 (2000). 
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What are we to make of this burgeoning literature on lockups (not to 
mention the equally vibrant case law, which we will explore in a 
moment)? As diverse and at times complex as the literature is, the 
debate can be distilled to three crucial issues: 1) whether courts should 
focus on maximizing value from an ex ante or an ex post perspective by 
promoting passivity or auctions, respectively ; 2) ·whether target 
managers can or will use lockups for disloyal purposes; and 3) what the 
appropriate measure of lockup "damages " should be. The first two 
issues implicate the longstanding debate about takeover defenses and the 
proper role of target managers, and the third focuses more narrowly on 
lockups. By exploring each of these issues, we can arbitrate among the 
existing approaches and develop a more compelling explanation of the 
role of lockups in corporate law. 
1. Ex Ante (Passivity) vs. Ex Post (Auction) Perspectives 
The first question, whether courts should focus on maximizing value 
ex ante or ex post, was inspired by Easterbrook and Fischel's so-called 
"passivity thesis" concerning target manager's appropriate response to 
unsolicited takeover bids. 30 Prior commentators had tended to assume 
that auctioning a target corporation to the highest bidder was the best 
outcome for the shareholders of target firms, since it would lead to 
higher bids. Easterbrook and Fischel challenged this reasoning. They 
pointed out that by forcing the initial bidder to pay more for the target 
corporation or even lose the bidding altogether, auctions reduce a 
bidder's expected profits. Potential bidders will therefore engage in less 
search in an auction regime than they would in a world that promised 
a greater return on their investment. Once a bid has been made-ex 
post-shareholders do better if the target's managers conduct an 
auction; but from an ex ante perspective, shareholders should prefer a 
regime that offers higher returns to initial bidders, since a bidder­
friendly regime leads to more takeover activity (as well as a greater 
deterrent effect on managers). On balance, Easterbrook and Fischel 
argue, shareholders benefit more from a world with more takeovers at 
somewhat lower prices, than they would with fewer takeovers at higher 
pnces. Rather than resisting takeovers, target managers should be 
30. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Tm Proprr Rule of a Target's Afanagement in Responding 
ton Tender Ojja, 94 Hi\!ZV. L. Rl::v. 11 61 (1981). Easterbrook & Fischel elaborated on their initi�d analysis 
in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions nnd Sunk Costs in Tender Of ers, 35 STA"i. L. REV. I 
(1982). Alan Schwanz subsequently seconded their view. Alan Schwartz, Search Theory nnd the Tender OJJrr 
Auction, 2 JL. Ecox & ORC. 229 (1986). 
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required to take a passive s tance, and submit every bid directly to the 
target's shareholders . 
Overlapping in many respects with the distinction between ex ame 
and ex post perspectives is the question whether to maximize 
shareholder value or social value. In some cases, a regime that 
maximizes shareholder value may not be optimal if we co nsider the 
efTect on every affected party·---cbat is ,  its overall soc i al value .  
Easterbrook and Fischel contend th at the ir passivity regime maxi mizes 
social value as well as shareholder value,  since a vibrant takeover marke t  
encourages managers to run their firms efficiently and inc reases the 
likelihood that inefficient firms will be taken over. 3 1  
I n  response to Easterbrook and Fischel, several commentators insisted 
that takeover auctions, rather than passivity, maximize both shareholder 
and social wealth.32 Although auctions reduce the expected returns to 
initial bidders, these commentators argued that active bidding assures 
that the target will be sold to the highest valuing bidder. Moreover, 
initial bidder search may be adequate even in an auction regime, in part 
because bidders can assure themselves a profit by buying target stock 
before making a bid. 33 
The two different perspectives imply differing views about whether 
and when lockups are appropriate. If  we ignore for a moment the 
possibility of target manager disloyalty, Easterbrook and Fischel's 
passivity view suggests that courts should welcome lockups to initial 
bidders. First bidder lockups can encourage an initial bid, and the 
3 1. Easterbrook & Fischel 's  argument that passivity maximizes shareholder value ove ral l  focuses on 
the shareholders as a collective - that is, all the sha reholders of all fi rms. Once a firm has received a 
takeover bid (that is,  ex post), the sha!·eholdcrs of that particular  fi rm are l i kely to receive a h ighe r p rice fO!" 
their  shares if managers encourage active bidding. The Delaware cases have tended to focus on this ex post 
shareholder perspective. 
3 2 .  Lucian A. Bebchuk,  The CllSejor Facifii.<J1ing Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1 02 8  ( 1 982) 
r1e reinafte r  Faciliuuing Competing Tender Of ers] ; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Comj1eting Tender 
Offers: A Rep{y and btension, 3 3  STA..t'l. L. REV. 23 ( 1982) [he re inafte r A Reply and Extension] ; Ro nald J.  
G i l son , Saking Competitive Bid.! Versu.r Pure Passiuiry in Tend<-r Offer Defeme, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51  ( 1 982). 
Bebchuk and Gi lson contended that auctions maximize both shareholder and social value, m uch as 
Easterbrook and Fischel viewed passivity as su perio r on both cou nts . 
3 3 .  In h is contribution to the debate, Ahn Schwan:,: emphasized that a bidder's p rofits (and thus  
the incentive to sea rch) wi l l  always be h igher if i t  acquires the fi rm ,  si nce this enables the bidde r to p roli t  
from a t  least 5 0 %  of t h e  fi rm's shares, rather than from a smal ler, mi nori ty stake. Schwartz, J1Jpra note 3 0 ,  
at  2 3 7 .  
Roosevel t ,  fo l lowing Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory t o  lnfonn Takevver 
Regulalion, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27  ( 1 99 1 ), point.s out that a negotiated merger may even lead to a higher 
p rice for shareholders ex post if  the t.;Hgct's assets have the same value for al l  potential  bidders- that is ,  if  
the assets are "common value." Target firms seem more l ikely to h ave bidder-specific values, howeve r,  
si nce bidders may have different synergies o r  d i fferent  management plans.  In the " independen t  val ues" 
context, auctions ordin'-lri ly  obtain more value for shareholders ex post .  See, e.g., Roosevel t ,  J1ljJm note 2 9 ,  
at 1 1 7 - 1 1 8. 
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lockup may under some circumstances reduce the likelihood that a 
second bidder will emerge and bid up the price that must be paid for the 
target. 34 Second bidder lockups, on the other hand, bring an additional 
bidder into the picture and should therefore be prohibited. In contrast 
to Easterbrook and Fischel, auction enthusiasts should be more 
sympathetic to second bidder lockups,  s ince they favor a regime that 
encourages active bidding. first bidder lockups arc problematic from 
this perspec tive if they disc o u rage addi tional bidding, but desirable if 
they induce an initial bid.  
2 .  Can Target .tv!anagers Use Lockups Disloyally? 
In addition to the distinction between passivity and auctions, a second 
crucial issue is whether target managers can use lockups disloyally. As 
we add disloyalty to the picture, the analysis will both describe the 
existing literature and begin more explicitly to develop my own 
normative view. 
Simply put, there are two camps on the disloyalty issue, those who 
conclude that managers cannot use lockups to further their own 
purposes, and those who view disloyalty as a serious concern. Fraidin 
and Hanson insist that target managers cannot use lockups disloyally. 
Not only do many managers have a significant stock interest, which 
encourages them to act in shareholders' interests, but they cannot 
successfully serve their own interests at the expense of target 
shareholders as a group because a bidder that protected disloyal 
managers would lose out to bidders who sought to run the firm in a 
more efficient manner.35 Based on their assumption that managers act 
loyally, Fraidin and Hanson conclude that courts should uphold both 
first and second bidder lockups. 
Notice that Fraidin and Hanson's support for second as well as first 
bidder lockups implies that they favor auctions rather than strict 
adherence to Easterbrook and Fischel's passivity approach.36 In a full 
enforcement regime where managers cannot act disloyally, the 
3+. This  reason ing l ies  at the heart o f Rooscvcl t's lockup analysis .  Roosevel t ,  supra note 29,  at 1 1 9. 
3 j .  See Fraidin & Hanson, supra no te ·f, at 1 788. Roosevel t  shares Fra idin and Hanson's view that 
managers cannot act d isloyal ly .  See Ruose,-c lt ,  Jupra note 29, at  1 06 .  
36.  In other  rcspecL>, Fraidin and Hanson's stance more close ly  accords with  the passivi ty view. 
Like Easterbrook and Fischel, they contend that Coasian bargaining will assure that the highest valuing 
bidder u l timately acqui res the target ,  even if a lower valuing bidder p revails in the first instance. But, as 
n o ted in the text, they defend second bidder locku ps, which often lead to auctions; and much of thei r  
amlvsis seems to assume that shareholders have a n  in terest in  maximizing value e x  post. For a discussion 
and crit ique ofF raid in  and Hanson's  support for second bidder lockups, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 
25, at 1 55 1 -5 2  n. 3 7 .  
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managers may use second bidder lockups to spur additional bidding. I n  
fact, loyal managers have a n  i ncentive, once the bidding has b e gu n ,  to 
do precisely this in order to m aximize valu e for sharehol ders ex post ,  
even if auctions are suboptimal from an ex ante perspective. A 
commentator who bel ieves both that auctions are inefficient a n d  that 
managers cannot act dis loyal ly should advise courts to perrnit  first 
bidder lockups but prohib i t second bidder lockups,  as Roosevel t  does in 
his recent analysis of lockups. In  effect ,  the prohibition on second 
bidder lockups serves as a prccom m i tment by managers not  c o  create an 
auction.37  
The obvious problem with each of these views is that the ciaim that 
m an agers always act loyally is implausib le .  In some (and p erhaps many) 
cases, target managers may grant a lockup that is large enough to e n able 
a lower valuing bidder to acquire the target.38 Al ternatively ,  target 
managers sometimes can tilt the playing fie ld enough--through 
differential access to information, for instance-to allow a l ower valu i ng 
b idder to win.39 At least as i mportant,  and of particular interest for 
p resent purposes, is managerial disloyalty that brings a higher valuing 
bidder into the contest.40 
Consider a simple illustration .  Hosti le  values Target at $67 5,000, and 
makes a hostile bid of  $600,000. Rather than accede to the bid, 
Target's managers look for and find an alternative bidder, Fri endly, who 
values Target at $700,000. In return for an implicit promise that 
Friendly will treat the managers wel l (by,  for instance, p reservin g  their 
j obs or offering an attractive severance package), Target ' s  m an agers 
grant Friendly a $20,000 lockup when Friendly bids .  Although the 
lockup does not change the bidders' relative valuations,  it  does reduce the 
amount that Friendly must pay to acquire Target. VVithout the l ockup, 
Friendly would win the bidding by offering (sligh tly m ore than) 
3 7. Prohibi ting second bidder lockups can thus be see n as responding to a col lective action p roblem. 
Loyal managers, on this view, would prefer that a l i  firms com m i t  ex ante to forego second bidder lockups 
in o rd e r  to maximize the benefits of t.1.keovcrs. Once a target firm receives a bid , however, loyal  target 
managt:rs have an incen tive to defect, and to generate competing bids so that they can o b tain  a higher p rice 
ex post .  Pmhibiting second bidder lock u ps would make defection somewhat more d i fiic u l t. 
38. This is the foreclosing lockup ident if1ed by Ayrcs-a locku p that exceeds the l ocku p bidder's 
expectation i nterest and which, as a res u l t, may fend off even higher val u ing bidders.  Ay1·es, supra n o te 1 4 ,  
at  699- 700. See also Coates & Subramanian, .111pm note 1 8  (arguing that lockups may often have a 
fo reclosing ef ect). 
39. For a discussion of reasons that even " loyal "  target managers may grant excessin: lockups, see 
Skeel,  supra note 5, at  57 5-80 (considering mistake and bargaining power d i f erences). 
40. Ft·aidin and Hanson would not treat such beha,·ior as managerial disloyalty, s i nce i ts effect is 
to bring in a higher val u ing bidder. See, e.g. ,  Fraid i n  & Hanson ,  sujml note 4, a t  1 809. Kahan and 
Klausner ,  by contrast, identify severa l reasons fo r ck nactc rizi n g  these kinds of lockups as disloyal ,  as  I 
discuss in the text below. See, e.g., Kahan & Kiausner, supr:t note 25 , at 1 5 6 1 - 6 2. 
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S 6 7  5 , 000 .  \Ni th the lockup , Friendly need only b id  (slightly more than) 
$ 65 5 ,000 ,  since Hostile will not pay more than E 6 7 5 ,000 (the S 6 5 5 ,000 
b i d ,  plus  the $20,000 lockup to Friendly) . So long as the implicit  side 
p aym e n t  to Target 's  m anagers costs Friendly less than S20 ,000, both 
Frie ndly and Target's managers benefi t  from the managers ' disloyal ty. 
Notice that,  under these conditions,  T a rget managers ' disl oyalty also 
c a n  be s e e n  as benefitti ng Targe t ' s  sh:uebolders ex post .  If Targe t 's 
managers bad s imply accepted Hosti l e ' s  bid,  the share h o l ders would 
h ave received only �600 ,000 . The Target managers' disloyal 
arrangement with Friendly brought Frie ndly into the bidding and 
i ncreased the final purchase price to S655 ,000 . Although an auction 
e n thusiast might welcome this result,  the outcome is troubling for a 
passivity theorist. To see why, we will focus o n  several c oncerns  
h ighlighted by :Wiarcel Kahan and :V1ichael Klausner .  vVe then \Vill 
return to the auction perspective. 
Drawing on the Easterbrook and Fischel insights, Kahan and 
Klausner emphasize two adverse effects of disloyal l ockups on the 
takeover marke t. First, disloyal lockups undermine p otential bidders' 
incentives to search .4 1  Because bidders like Hostile may lose the target, 
as i n  my example ,  and must pay more even if they win ,  disloyal lockups 
reduce their reward for discovering suitable targets. Second, by giving 
Target managers a way to cut themselves a deal , these lockups impair 
the disciplinary effect of the takeover market on managers . 42 Although 
the illustration involved a second bidder lockup, first bidder lockups can 
be equally pernicious. Nianagers who know an unwanted bid is coming 
can try to preempt the hostile bid by offering a first bidder l ockup to a 
friendly bidder. 
To address these concerns, Kahan and Klausner p ropose the three­
fold typology oflockups n oted earlier.43 They call for searching scrutiny 
of second bidder lockups and preemptive first bidder l ockups of the sort 
I have just described, which they call "anticipatory" lockups. Only the 
third category oflockups, "nonanticipatory first bidder" lockups,  escape 
their condemnation.++ Target managers who give nonanticipatory first 
bidder lockups are not trying to thwart an unwanted bidder. Because 
these lockups may encourage a bidder to bid and do not interfere with 
the market for corporate control, Kahan and Klausner bel ieve that 
courts should generally uphold them. 
4 1 .  Sec Kahan & Klausner, J-ujml note 25, at  1552-59. 
42. See Iff. at 1 559 -6 2. 
+3. See .1-ujJTa notes 26-2 7 .  
44. Sa Kahan & Klausner, supra note 25 , a t  1 564-65 (close scru t iny of s<.:co nd b i d d er and 
ant ic i p:ttO I"Y lockups but  not nonan tici patory locku ps). 
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The three-fold typology i s  an important advance i n  our 
understanding of lockups, but it  also suffers from two significant 
l imitations .  The first is an obvious line-drawing problem. The typology 
assumes that courts can easily distinguish bet1veen anticipator)' and 
nonanticipatory first bidder lockups. Yet many lockups fal l  i n  the hazy 
middle ground be twe en these two categories. A lo c kup granted after an 
unwanted bidder clearly signals its in tent i o n  co mJ.ke a bid is 
a n ticipatory,  but the issue becomes less clear if  the potemiJ.l b�ddcr has 
s imply indicated a general level of interest. Simil arly, if  targe t manage rs 
know that their firm is likely to be subject to an unwanted takeover bid, 
and enter into a lockup arrangement at a time when the writing is o n  
the v;all ,  but no specific hostile bidder has emerged,  the l ockup would 
apparently qualify as nonanticipatory.45 Yet the prospect of such 
lockups may discourage search and enable target managers to insulate 
themselves from the disciplinary effects of a takeover, much as a truly 
anticipatory lockup does. 
Nlore importantly, the typology assumes that anticipatory and second 
bidder lockups are invariably undesirable. 46 Yet even disloyal lockups 
have benefits that may outweigh their undesirable effects .  Under 
existing law, target managers have a wide variety of devices for resisting 
takeovers, including takeover defenses such as poison p il ls  as well as 
state antitakeover l aws. Although lockups can be used defensively ,  too, 
they differ in one crucial respect from other defenses. By granting a 
lockup , target managers relinquish their independence, since lockups are 
used in connection with mergers and related transactions. Rather than 
keeping all bidders out, as other defenses often do, lockups let one 
bidder in. If the ability to use a lockup encourages target managers to 
accede to a change in control , and if the managers might otherwise have 
resisted all bidders by 'just saying no,"47 even disloyal lockups may serve 
45 .  The rece n t  Vv'arner L'1mbcrt takeover battle can be used to i l lust:·ate the d i me u l ty.  Negotiations 
between Warner Lambert and American Home Products were well  underway, b u t  the parties had not 
reached a fi nal agreement, when Pfizer announced an inten tion to make a bid for \Varner L>m bert .  
Shortly thereafte r, \Varner Limbert and American Home Products signed a pre l im i nary m e rger agreement 
tha t i ncl uded a S  1.8 bi l l ion ter mi nation fee .  See, e.g., A.forr P&G, vVhat's Next in P)i::..er War, WAU. ST. j . ,Jan.  
27 ,  2000, a t  C I .  Under the three-fold typology, th is termination fcc would  p resumably qua l i fy as 
ant ic ipatory, given Pfizer's intent  to bid. If Pfizer had been less explicit  about  i ts in tem ions , hown·er, or 
Pfizn were not  yet  p repared to make a serious bid , the dist inction between an tic i pato ry and 
nonantici patory would be q u i te m u rky. Notice, too, that a potential bidder would have a strategic i ncen tive; 
to annou nce an i n tt:rest in order to desta b i lize the target's i n tended agreem e n t  with anmhcr bidder .  
46. R,uher than cal l ing for blanket p rohibi tion,  Kahan and Klausnct· p rov ide a multifactor test  fo r 
determining whether these lockups should be struck dow n .  See Kahan & Klausne r, supra note 2 5 ,  at 1 564-
68. But they seem to e nvision that nearly all wi l l  be invalidated. 
4 7 .  for a prominen t  article con tending that Delaware permits m anagers to ' j ust  say no," sccjoseph 
A. Grundlest, Jus/ Vol, No: .i !vfinimalist Strategy for Dealing wilh Barbari!UJ.S !TLJ-ide ilu! Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 
85 7 ( 1993). I describe the sign i l'lcancc of this possi b i l i ty in more d e tai l  below. 
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a beneficial function .  I n  effect, lockups may "bribe " target managers to 
agree to a change in control they vvould otherwise resist .  +B 
If target managers truly had the power to "j ust say no" under current 
law, the argument for permitting (at  least  some) disl oyal lockups to 
entice target managers to relinquish control would be especially strong.+'� 
The reality is more complex, however .  r-'\l though Largct managers can 
resist nearly any bid so long as they remain in  power, hostile bidders can 
wage a proxy fight in an effort to replace the incumbent directo rs .  Afte r  
a successful proxy figh t, t h e  hostile bidder can effect a takeover .  Added 
to the threat of a p roxy fight is the possibility that institutional 
sh areholders may pressure the target's managers to agree to a takeover. 
The question, then, is  whether the possibility of a proxy fight frees up 
the market for control enough to make anticipatory and second bidder 
lockups unnecessary. In my view, i t  does not .  The proxy contest 
alternative is an expensive and time-consuming mechanism for 
obtaining control .  Moreover, if the target firm has a s taggered board 
whose members can only be removed for cause , i t  may be impossible to 
replace a majority of the board's directors in a single proxy fight. The 
prospect of target resistance and the limitations of a h ostile bidder's 
alternatives suggests that even potentially disloyal lockups m ay play a 
desirable role .50 
If we shift from Kahan and Klausner--who draw most directly  from 
the ex ante , passivity perspective-to the views of an auction enthusiast 
who concedes the possibil ity of managerial disloyalty, the case for 
permitting b oth anticipatory and second bidder lockups (at least i n  some 
cases) becomes still stronger. vVe have already seen the most i mportant 
benefit of "disloyal" lockups: they require target managers to agree to 
a change of control transaction.  Interestingly, and of particular 
importance for auction enthusiasts, the lockup strategy gives the 
48. I discuss lockups' role i n  enticing target managers to re l inqu ish  control at greater length in 
another article. See David A. Skeel,  Jr . ,  Lockups, Agenry Cos/.s and Remedies in Curpomte Lnw (un publ ished 
manuscript, 1 996); see also Roosevelt, supra note 29, at I 09 (noting that lockups a rc i neffective as an 
en trenchment devise). See also Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 4, at 1 82 7 ,  1 8 3 1  (" LTJ he board loses much of 
its control . . .  when the board agrees to sell  the targeL").  
-�9.  Among lockup commentators, Fra idin  and Hanson suggest that Delaware does indeed permit 
targe t managers to 'just say no." See Fraidin & Hanson, supm note 4, at 1 82 7  n . 344.  Kahan & Klausner 
r�jcct this \ · iew, largely for the reasons noted in the text that fol lows. See Kahan & Klausner, sujm1 note 25, 
a t  1 55 1 -5 2  n . 3 7 .  A federal j udge i n  Delaware has held that Delaware docs recognize "j ust  s�1y no" as a 
defense, but  the Delaware state cou rts have not  explic i t ly  addressed the issue.  My own view, as suggested 
bclo"', is that target managers have significant but not u n l i m i ted abi l i ty to resist takeovers. 
SO. Interestingly, if one were to conclude that p roxy contests and other pressures do obviate the need 
to al low a n ticipatory o r  second bidder lockups, the most plausible sol u tion might be to prohibi t  a l l  lockups.  
Given the dilliculty of distinguishing anticipatory from nonamicipawry lockups, there is a strong case for 
adopting a blanket prohibition . Alan Schwanz's early host i l ity to lockups seems to reflect an analogous 
i n t u i tion. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at  238.  
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managers a powerful  incentive to search for the h ighes t valuing bidder . 
Disloyal managers m ay sometimes help a preferred,  l ower valuing 
bidder to acquire the target,  as noted e arlier .  But the target managers' 
only sure path to success is  to find a higher valuing, friendly b idder . 
In the earl ie r  i l lustration,  fo r instance,  Friendly won the biddinp· . 0 
b ecause i t  placed a h igher val ue on Target (13 7 00,000) than Hosti le  did 
(:5 6 7 5 ,000) . '' '  _-\s n o ted earl i e r, Targe t ' s managers and Friendly both 
benefit so l o ng as the managerial protections are worth up to S 2 0 ,000 
and Target 's sh areholders benefit from the higher takeover pre mium . 
In short, for a n  auc tion enthusiast,  concerns about managers dis l oyal ty 
are counterbalanced by the facts that lockups encourage Target's  
managers both to rel inquish the firm's independence and to find a 
higher valuing bidder.  
To summarize, the possibil ity of managerial disloyalty complicates the 
lockup ana lysis in intriguing respects. From an ex ante, p assivity 
perspective , both anticipato ry and second bidder l ockups are 
p robl ematic, since they may introduce an additional bidder and thus 
undermine an initial bidder's returns from search.  Yet, because they 
force target managers to relinquish their independence, lockups also 
offer countervailing benefits. The question for proponents of  p assivi ty,  
then,  is  whether lockups ' value as an enticement to target managers 
outweighs the chilling effect they have o n  bidder search. 
For auction enthusiasts, the benefits of lockups a re both 
straightforward and compelling. To the extent l ockups promo te bidding 
and encourage target managers to sleuth out the highest valuing b i dder,  
they help to achieve the p ri ncipal benefits of an aucti o n  regime.  
Lockups should thus be especially attractive to auction theorists, at  l east 
to the extent they are appropriately constrained. 
In a moment, we will  consider how lockup compensation,  the l ast  of 
the three factors , can be used to provide appropriate constraints .  But 
first v;e should b rief1y address the most recent academic perspective on 
the  lockup issue.  
As our discussion of target manager disl oyalty suggests, much of the 
existing commentary has focused on agency costs and oth e r  distorti ons 
facing target firms . In a new articl e ,  John Coates and Guhan 
Subramanian contend that a variety of distortions m ay affect  bidder 
decision making. Included in their  account are bidder agency costs ;  
information effects (a lockup increases t h e  information that a lockup 
bidder can derive from a second bidder's bid); swi tch ing costs; 
reputational effects (a lockup bidder may have a reputational s take in 
5 1 .  See J11pra text fol lowing note 40. 
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winning the bidding) ;  and e ndowment effects . 52 I n  their  view, lock ups 
have an asymmetric effect because o f  these b uy-side distortions.  
vVhereas lockups decre ase an alternative bidder's wil l ingness to bid,  
buy-side distortions cause the l o ckup bidder to ignore the vaiuc of the 
lockup and to continue biddi ng. Coates and Subramanian thus add 
anothe r s e t  of cxplanali o n s  as co how l o c kups may tilt the deck in favor 
of a lockup bidder.  
The extent to which these be havioral eiTects alter the exisling 
accounts o f l ockups is unclear, however.53 Two impo rtan t  caveats are 
in  order. First, the buy-side distortions may cancel out  if the other, 
" locked out" bidder is subject  to some of the same distortions as the  
lockup bidder. I n  a rapidly consolidating industry, for instance,  agency 
costs and repu tationa! e ffects may significan tly alter the decision making 
of the locked out bidder.5"' Second, C oates and Subramanian seem to 
focus on cases in which target managers grant a l ockup to the first 
bidder. The recipient of a second bidder lockup seems l ess  likely to face 
the kinds of distortions that Coates and Subramanian iden tify .  
3 .  Lockup D am ages: Reliance vs .  Expecta ti o n  
A s  with their differing views on the p assivity-versus-auction debate 
and the likelihood of disloyal lockups, commentators als o  h ave sharply 
diverged in their conclusions about the appropriate size of l ockups. 
Several commentators have argued that a bidder's l ockup shoul d  be 
based on some component of the bidder's costs ,  either  its total pre- and 
post-bid costs ,  or solely i ts post bid costs.55 O thers, notably the second 
generation theorists, have suggested that courts should focus o n  the 
bidder's expected profits-its exp ectation interest, in contract damages 
terms. 56 In their apologia for l ockups, Fraidin and Hanson defend even 
" 7  supra-expectancy lockups. )  
S 2 .  See Coates & Subramanian,  supra note 1 8, a t  40-49. 
S3. Coates and Subr:�manian p rm·ide empi rical evidence suggesting that bidder.; that reeei,·c lockups 
are much more likely to win the bidding. As they recognize, however, i t  is not clear whether lockups 
inc rease a bidder's l ikel ihood of success, or whether target managers tend to give locku ps to bidders " ho 
are l i kely to win. See id. at 60. 
54 .  I n  the recent contest to acqu i re Warner L1mbert, for instance, Pfizer had at least as great a 
re puta tional stake (and agency costs) in winning as did American Horne Products, the bidder that rt:ccived 
the lockup. 
S S .  See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2 5 ,  at 1 S65 ("If the value of a lockup exceeds a reasonable 
estimate of the lockup bidder's cosL' of bidding, the lockup should be invalidated .").  Kahan and Klausner 
apparently would perm i t  large r lockups i f  the lockup is  nonanticipatory. Su ui. (propos ing close scru t iny 
and compensation l imi ts only fo r second bidder and anticipatory· locku ps). 
S 6 .  Se e Ayres, suj,ra note 1 4, a t 699-703 . 
57. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson, J11/"" note 4, at 1 782,  1 82 7-28. 
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Consider first  the view of passivity proponents who do not bel ieve 
lockups c an be used disloyally.58 Such theorists would not impose any 
restrictions on the size of a first bidder lockup : the larger the b e tter, i n  
fact,  since a large lockup might discourage additional bids and thus 
maximize the initial bidder's re turns from search.  From this perspective, 
large firsc bidder lockups are attractive because they reduce the 
likelihood of an auction . (Second b idder l ockups,  of course ,  should be 
prohibited because they have the opposite cf1cct) . -;9 
O nce vve take the possibility of disloyal ty into accoun t, h owever, 
permitting unlimited first bidder l ockups p roves more problematic. 
Because anticipatory first bidder lockups undermine bidder re turns and 
the market for corporate control,  they should be prohibited if p ossibl e .  
The distinction bet\veen anticipatory and nonanticipatory first bidder 
l ockups migh t suggest that all nonancipatory first bidder lockups should 
be enforced, no matter how large. 5° But, as we have seen, it  m ay often 
be difficult to distinguish beween anticipatory and nonanticipatory first 
b idder lockups, which suggests that courts should be hesitant about 
approving large lockups. 
Doctrinal considerations raise additional concerns about exp ectation 
and supraexpectancy lockups. From a structural perspective , directors 
can propose a merger or related transaction, but shareholders are 
enti tled to make the final decision whether or not to p ermit the 
transaction to go forward.6 1  An expectancy or supracompensatory 
lockup stands in tension with the p rinciple of shareholder authority, 
since it  promises to pay the lockup bidder i ts expectation damages if the 
lockup bidder is  outbid by another bidder. In effect, such l o ckups 
promise to treat the lockup bidder as if the merger were approved, even 
if it is not.  62 To be sure, expectancy lockups are not a precise substitute 
for a completed contract. S ome lockup provisions o nl y  require the 
target to compensate the lockup bidder if the target enters into an 
alternative transaction before the lockup expires, for instance.  But the 
potential for interference with shareholders' role in corporate decision 
58. Roosevelt  i s  the:  commentator who takes t h i s  pcr�pective m o s t  consistently. Su Roosevelt ,  sujJra 
note 29, :.J t  ! 06 .  
59. An auctio n theorist who believes t h a t  target m;ungers cannot or wil l  n o t  a c t  d i sloyally would 
u phold bo th lirst and second bidder lockups, since both can be used to sti m ulate bidding. Fraidin and 
Hanson adopt someth i n g  l i ke this view, though their  analysis de,· iatcs from th:.Jt of the auction theo rists in 
some respects. See supra note 36. 
60. Th is seems to be Kahan and Klausner's view, although they leave open the poss ib i l i ty that 
cou rts migh t sometimes strike down an nonanticipatory lockup under busi ness judgment rule scrutiny. See 
Kahan & Klausne1·, J11pra note 25 ,  at 1565. 
6 1 .  See. e.g., Du .. C O D F. ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1 (Supp .  1 998) (requir ing shareholder approva l of merger). 
62. See Skeel,  .rupra note S ,  at 584-86 (discussing structural or  "process" concerns). 
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making suggests the need for a different, lesser yardstick for measuring 
lockup compensation.  The conflict is especial ly s tark with 
supraexpectancy lockups,  because they may fore close another, higher 
val uing bidder. 
As I have argued at l ength elsewhere, a reliance-based approach is 
chc most pl ausible can didate for determining lockup cornpens ation .63 
Limiting the lockup bidder to i ts rel iance i nterest reduces the pernic i ous 
effects o f  disloyal l ockups, by making it  far more difficult to use the 
lockup to deter other bidders and by l imiti ng the s ize of the fund tha t  
c a n  be used for implicit side payme nts t o  the target's managers . A t  the 
same time,  the reliance approach preserves the most important benefits 
of lockups. A reliance-based lockup should be large enough to induce 
bidders to make a bid, and i t  also encourages o therwise reluctant 
managers to give up the target's independence. This reasoning suggests 
that both first and second bidder lockups should be presumptively 
enforced up to the amount of a bidder's reliance interest .  
Interestingly, although I have argued that lockup b idders should not  
receive the same entitlements as  the pro misee in  a completed contract, 
analogizing lockups to l iquidated damages p rovisions in traditional 
contexts reinforces the case for a reliance-based app ro ach.  The 
traditional view that contractual promisees should receive their 
expectancy interest is  based in part on the assumption that the p romisee 
gave up the opportunity to secure identical profits in connection with 
another contract when it entered into the contract in question . 64 In the 
lockup context, the lockup bidder often does not have iden tical , or even 
si milar alternative opportunities. If there were no similar oppo rtunities 
in prospect, the argument for compensating the l ockup bidder for 
anticipated profits on foregone opportunities is much weaker.65 For 
bidders who do have other opportunities, moreover, any expected 
p rofits should be discounted to reflect the possibility that the bidder 
would fail to acquire the o ther target. 
Although reliance shoul d appeal both to proponents of  p assivity and 
to auction p roponents, I should acknowledge that i t  fits less naturally 
into the passivity approach. Because passivi ty theorists "vish to maxi­
mize the l ikelihood that an initial , outside bidder will win the c ontest,  
63. Stt id. at  595-60 I .  
6-L See, e.g. , C harles ].  Goe l7. & Robe rt  E. Scott, Enji�rcing Promi.rc.r: An Eraminativn vj tk  BllJi.r of 
Cuntract, 89 YALE LJ. 1 2 6 1, 1 284, 1 287-88 ( 1 980) (arguing tha t  the rel iance measure would be superi o r  to 
expectation if cou rts' awards took al l  of a prom isee's foregone opportun i ties i n to acco u n t) .  
65.  See Skeel ,  ru,/Jra note 5,  at 596. I do not  mean to suggest that  lockup bidders should be limited 
to the i r  o u t-ol�pockct costs . The bidder's reliance interest also cou ld incl ude compensation for fac tors such 
;ts the manageria l t ime devoted to the acqu isit ion effort. My poin t  is s imply  t h a t  a bidder's a l ternati,·e 
prospects usual ly are much less certain than those of other contractual promisees. 
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they would prefer l ockups that favored only this bidder. I have argued 
that the difficul ty of distinguishing anticipatory and nonanti cipalOI)' 
bids,  toge ther with the need under current  l aw to encourage managers 
to accede to changes of control ,  justify enforcement of bidders ' rel iance 
inter e s t  under second as wel l  as first bidder lockups .  For a passivi tv 
theo ri s t ,  the rel iance approach is the refo re a " second best''  sol u tion--a n  
impi ic i t  " b ribe " t o  m anagers that would n o t  be necessary i f  1nan agers 
vvcre prohibited from defending agains t  takeovers. 
For auction enthusiasts, by contrast, the reliance-based approach 
should have a far more direct appeai.66 Auction enthusiasts favor 
devi ces that induce an additional bidder to e nter, thus stimulating an 
auction,  and reliance-based lockups have precisely this  effect . By paying 
a bidder 's  costs, target managers can persuade an otherwise reluctant 
bidder to make a bid. The managers' motivations may b e  suspect, but 
they have a strong interest in finding the highes t valuing bidder and 
their actions have the consequence of spurring bidding . 
The analysis thus makes clear that courts should enforce both first 
and second bidder lockups .  Yet the reliance approach also l eaves 
flexibil ity for courts to adj ust their scrutiny in light of the nature of the 
lockup in question. Perhaps most importantly, courts should constru e  
reliance especially strictly with second bidder lockups .67 The costs o f  
bidding are often lower for a second bidder (in part, because they can 
free ride on the search efforts of the initial bidder), and the lost  
opportunity costs for second bidders are likely to be lower. 68 C ourts 
should take each of these considerations into account in determining the 
lockup bidder's reliance interest. The same reasoning suggests that 
courts should construe reliance more restrictively with a lockup that is 
clearly anticipatory, since such bids may free ride on an exp e cted bid. 
Courts should not deny compensation altogether, however. Because 
anticipatory lockups may entice target managers to relinquish control, 
they too should be enforced up to the amount of the bidder's reliance 
interest .  Courts also should distinguish among the dif erent kinds of 
lockups.  Interestingly, desp ite the judicial hostili ty to stock l ockups ,  
stock lockups arguably should be encouraged because they give the 
65. From the p e rspective of De laware law, the auction perspective is the mo t·c re levant approach, 
since it accords mor e closely with the Delaware court5' cmph«s is on maximizing value  for shareholders i n  
a takeover auction. 
67. Su Skeel, supra n ote 5 ,  at 600-0 l .  
68. Secon d  bidders also may not have as great a reputational stake as the first bidder. A fi rst bidd e r  
that entas i n tO a p roposed merger with the target but then loses a bidding contest t o  a su bseq u e n t  bidder 
may, as a result,  become ,·iewed a takeove r ta rgu itself. 
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lockup bidder a moneta ry stake that increases as  the  winning b id of  
another bidder increases .60 
B. Convergence cf Theory and Practice ! Lockups in the Delaware Courts 
As i n  the acaderr.ic l i terature , l ockups h ave plavecl an in cre asi ngly 
p rom i n c nL role i n  the Delaware takeovc rj urisprudence s ince  the e arliest 
important cases in the 1 980s .  At times,  the academ ic l i terature and the 
Del a'>vare cases have seemed to have l i ttle in common. In its most 
recent case,  however, the Delaware Supreme Court has offered i ts 
s u b tlest  analysis of lockup issues to date, and has sugges ted an approach 
that accords with the reliance approach I have defended above . The 
analysis that fol lows briefly describes the earl ier Delaware case law, then 
turns to the supreme court's most recent pronouncement, Brazen v .  BeLL 
A tlantic Corp . .  7 0  
In most of the pre-Brazen cases, Delaware courts have tended to treat 
lockups as part of the larger question of  whether target managers 
fulfi l led their fiduciary duties. In several cases where target managers 
entered in to merger agreements v"� th one bidder and no competing 
bidder emerged, or where the lockup came at the end of  an auction,  the 
courts scrutinized both the overall transaction and the lockup 
arrangement under the business judgment rule .  I n  these cases ,  
Delaware upheld even large lockups-lockups that affected as much as 
20% of the target's stock. 7 1  Delaware courts take a much closer l ook 
both at target managers ' overall periormance and at the lockup ,  
however, when a n  additional bidder emerges either before or after the 
managers grant a lockup to a favored bidder.  The seminal cases are 
Revlon, Inc. v. A1aGAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 72 and Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC .Network lnc.73  
In Revlon, Revlon granted a lockup to Forstmann, Little in the midst 
of a bidding contest between Forstmann, the "white knight," and Pantry 
Pride, an umvanted hostile bidder. In  addition to articulating i ts famous 
Revlon duties, which require managers to obtain the best reasonably 
obtainable  value for shareholders once a sale of the target becomes 
inevitable ,  the Delaware Supreme Court also appl ied searching scrutiny 
-- -·---------·----- ----- -----
69. See Co:J.tcs and Subr:J.manian, supra note 1 3 , at 6 7 -68.  
70. 695 A.2d 43 (Del.  1 997). 
7 1 .  See, e.g., Y:J.no1' v. Scientific Leasing, Inc. , No. CIV.A. 9536, 1 988 WL 8772  (Del. Ch. Fe b.  8, 
1 988) ( 1 6 . 6%, toge ther "·ith bidding cxp<.:nses); Hecco Vcn t u r·cs 1·. Sca-Ltnd Corp . ,  No. CIV.A. 8486, 
1 986 \VL 5840 (Del.  Ch .  May 1 9, 1 986) (2 1 . 7 %) .  
72 506 A.2d 1 7 3  (Del .  1 986). 
73. 637 A..2d 34 (Del. !994). 
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t o  the $ 1 25 million lockup . Because i t  was n o t  persuaded t h a t  t h e  
Revlon bo ard reasonably believed that the l ockup vvould ben efit 
shareholders and that Revlon's shareholders were assured an adequate 
benefit ,  the supreme court refused to enforce the lockup.  
In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court once again appl i ed its 
enhanced fiduciary dury and lockup standards. Because Paramount ,  the 
target, fai led to adequately consider an unwanted  b iclcle r, QVC ,  the 
D el aware S upreme Court held that i ts agreement  'vvi th the Ewore:d 
bidder, Viacom, viol ated the directors' Revlon duties .  Included \Vithin 
the overall agreement was a stock lockup that permitted Viacom to 
purchase 1 9 . 9% of Paramount's stock if another bidder acquired 
Paramount. Because the option could prove unreasonably gen erous, the 
supreme court concluded that it  too must be struck down.H 
The cases discussed thus far can b e  described as taking a p u re 
fiduciary duty approach to lockup arrangements.  Focusing solely o n  
fiduciary duty has several related l imitations . O n e  limitation i s  that the 
lockup and fiduciary duty inquiries blur together if  courts apply the 
same analysis in both contexts . Courts tend to strike down a l ockup if 
they disapprove of the managers' overall performance, and uphold 
lockups when the managers have satisfied their fiduciary duties .  Yet 
lockups can perform a valuable function (recall that they serve as an 
implicit "bribe")  even if the  directors h ave othenvise breached their 
duties .  A more distinct lockup standard would help to distinguish the 
lockup and overall duty inquiries.  A second, quite similar issue is  that 
the fiduciary duty analysis can obscure the crucial issue of l ockup 
compensation-whether the lockup is p roperly calibrated or excessive . 
In  Brazen, its most recent lockup case, the Delaware Supreme Court 
appears to address precisely these concerns. Brazen arose as a class 
action filed by shareholders ofBell Atlantic asking the Delaware c ourts 
to invalidate a $550 million termination fee Bell Atlantic granted to 
NYNEX in connection with their proposed merger. In upholding the 
termination fee,  C hiefjustice Veasey explicitly eschewed the fiduciary 
duty approach in favor of a contractual analysis. Because the m e rger 
agreement characterized the termination fee as l iquidated damages,  he 
held that a liquidated damages analysis should apply. Under D elaware 
law, such a provision is enforceable if "the damages are uncertain and 
the amount agreed upon is  reasonable . " 75 Applying this  standard, the 
74.  Sa id. at jQ-j l .  The court questioned the terms of the lockup and emphasized tint the stock 
option "had the potential to reach (and in this case d id  reach) unreasonable le"e ls ." !d. at  39 . 
75 .  !rf. at 48 (quoting Lee Builders v. Wells, 1 03 A.2d 9 1 8, 9 19 (Del . Ch.  19 5 4)). To dct<:rminc 
reasonableness, De laware courts focus on 1 )  " the anticipated loss by e i ther party should the merger not 
occur;" and 2) "the d illicu1ty of calculating that loss." !d. 
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Supreme Court concluded that the l5550 mill ion fee properly took 
account ofNYNEX's o ut-of-pocket and related costs ,  and that i ts val u e ,  
"2% of B e l l  Atl antic 's  market capitalizati o n  of $ 2 8  bil l ion . . .  falls well 
within the range of  termination fees upheld as reasonable  by the courts 
of this S tate . "76  
Braz.en do e s not  ab:::m don the earl i e r  Delaware cases , 7 7  and the 
i i quidated dam ages inquiry overl aps in important respects wi th standard 
fiduciary duty analysis . '{et the case marks an important  develop m e n t  
in Delaware 's lo ckup j ur isprudence.  By focusing explicit ly o n  th e 
compensation issue,  the court has laid the grou ndwork fo r more 
complete appreciation of the effects of lockup arrangem ents.  
Not least of the attractions of the case for this author, of course,  is that 
Brazen fi ts so neatly with the reliance damages approach to lockups.  The 
connection between the two suggests three important issu es to watch for 
as future Delaware cases deve lop the insights of Brazen . The first is the 
question whether courts will uphold future lockups u nder the Brazen 
analysis even i n  cases where target directors violate their Revlon or Unocal 
duties. 78 In nearly every earlier case, courts have reached the same 
conclusion-either to uphold or invalidate-on both directors '  duties  
and o n  the l ockup .79 As we have seen,  the rel iance damages approach 
suggests that lockups may be valuable even if the directors have 
otherwise breached their duties, and Brazen could e asily lend itself to a 
similar conclusion .80 
76.  !d. at  49. 
77. Had Bra<_en overturned prior law, the Delaware S u p reme Cou r t  wou l d  have been requ i red to 
decide the case en bane, rather than in a three j udge panel. See David A. Skee l , Jr . ,  The Unanimity }fonn in 
Delaware Corporate Lnw, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 2 7 ,  1 36 n . 3 1 ( 1 997). The fact  that Bra-:en was decided by a three 
j udge panel u nderscores that the j ustices viewed the case as consiste n t  with the existing supreme court case 
bw. 
78. G iven that Bra:un invo lved a mer·ger of equals, i t  is also possible that Delaware w i l l  l i m i t  i ts 
app l ication to this  context. The analysis of th is Article suggests that the approach should also be applied 
i n  cases that i m pl ica te target managers' Rev/on or Unoca/ du ties. 
79. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Dd. 1 985), can be seen as an exception,  since the Delaware 
Supreme Court le ft the stock option lockup i n  place but held that the ta rget d i rectors had breached the ir  
du ty of ca re. But  the  Van Corkum decision did not expressly address the vali d i ty of the loc k u p .  
80.  A good i l lustration of this point, and an additional basis for optimism a bo u t  the trend of the 
Deb ware case law, is the stock lockup and termination fee in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network 
Inc, 63 7 A.2d 34 (Del. 1 994). The lockup with Viacom arguably was an ticipato ry i n  nature, and the stock 
o ption and term ination fee as a whole exceeded any reasonable rel iance i n terest of Viacom .  Sa Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 25, at 1 568. Yet the S IOO mil l ion termination fee, by itself, was a plausible esti mate 
ofVi::�com's reli::�nce interest. The analysis of this Article thus suggests that the chancery court in QVC was 
correct i n  str ik ing down the stock option but u pho lding the termi nation fee .  See Skeel ,  supra note 5, at  602 
(discussing QVC Nen,·ork, Inc. v. Paramoun t  Communications, Inc., 635 A. 2d 1 245 ( 1 993)). Because the 
chancery court's te rmination fcc ru l i ng was not appealed,  the Delaware S u p reme Court did not address 
the issue. See Paramount, 6 3 7  A.2d at  50 n . 2 2 .  Bra<_en cites the chancery court an::�lysis on th is issue w i t h  
apparen t  appro,·al, h owe\·er, w h i c h  suggests t h a t  t h e  Delaware Supreme Court m a y  a p p l y  si m i l a r  reasoning 
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Second, C hief Justice Veasey rej ected Brazen's  cont e n tion t hat, 
because the lockup would b e  triggered if  shareholders rej ected the 
NYNEX merger, it coerced shareholders to approve the m erge r. 8 1  
Al though the C hief J ustice's  concl usion that the lockup should b e  
upheld even i f  i t  affected the shareholders '  vote seems correct ,82 i t  could 
be (mis)construed as  permitting courts to  enforce expectation-based and 
suoraexoec tancv l ockups . As \VC h ave see n , structural factors-mosL l i • 
impo nandy, the implicit  null ific atio n  o f  shareholders ' right to determ i n e  
whether a merger is approved-counsel against such a swe eping 
reading.83 Perhaps more imp ortantly, such a reading would conflict  
with the focus of Brazen and the reliance damages approach o n  awarding 
a l ockup bidder its out-of-pocket and related costs ,  rathe r  than full  
expectation damages.  
The final issue to watch for is whe th e r  the Delaware courts will  a djust  
their  interpretation of appropriate lockup damages as  they apply i t  to  
different bidding contests-most  importantly, whether Delav.rare 
construes  the lockup bidders' costs more narrowly in the second bidder 
context than with first bidders .  Once again ,  Brazen' s  focus o n  reliance­
based costs lends itself easily to j ust these kinds of distincti ons.  
C. Lockups in Bankruptcy 
As i n  corporate law, bre akup fees and other lockup arrangements p l ay 
a prominent role in many corporate bankruptcy cases. The question 
that courts and commentators have asked, and rightly so,  is  whether 
l ockups offer the same benefits in bankrup tcy as they do i n  c o rp o rate 
l aw .  To answer this question and to determine h ow b ankruptcy l ockups 
should b e  treated, let us b riefly consider the three factors we u s e d  to 
explore lockups in the corporate context. 
On the first factor, the choice b e tween passivity and auctions, the 
consensus view seems to be that courts should adop t an a uction 
p e rspective and focus on maximizing valu e  ex post.  Even Kim 
Roosevelt, a relentless advocate of passivity outside of b ankruptcy, 
believes that there is no reason to worry about ex ante considerations 
such as bidder search once a bankruptcy petition has b e e n  filed .  B+ 
i n  fu t u re cases. See Brazen v. Bell  Atlan ti c Corp, 695 A.2d 4 3 , 49 n . 2 0  (Del.  1 997) .  
8 1 .  See Bro._zen, 695 A.2d at  50.  
8 2 .  For a s imi lar  ,·icw, sec Bain bridge, supm note I 0, a t  285 (Termination fees that  "im·okc only 
a (relat ively] smal l  percentage of the value of the transaction . . .  (are) unlikely to coerce sharehol d e rs.") .  
83 .  See sujJrn. notes 55-56 and accom panying text. 
84. See Roosevelt ,  supm note 29 , at  1 2 5 .  Although Roosevelt suggesLi that managers can somet imts  
maxi mize va lue  th ro ugh a negotiated sale rather than an auction,  he contends that  cou rts should a>sess 
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Roosevel t  suggests that all bankrupt firms are targets-p resumably 
because fin ancial distress signals that the firm's assets can o r  shoul d be 
redeployed. Thus, bankruptcy itself serves to  identify the firm as  a 
targe t. Yet bankrup tcy is an extraordinarily noisy signal . ::Vlany 
bankrup t firms would make poor acquisitions , for i nstance,  and even 
viable bankrup tcy: debtors may be m o re val uable under their existi ng 
manao·ers d1an under a third 1) artv. Bidder search-the effort to identifv 0 J � 
targets-is there fore j ust as i mp ortant in bankruptcy as under corporate 
l aw. As a resul t ,  the debate as to whether couns should favor p assivity 
(to encourage search) or conduct auctions is relevant in b ankruptcy, as 
in corporate law, and one's  views on the debate will influence their view 
of bankrup tcy lockups.  
If we shift to the second factor, managerial disloyalty ,  bankruptcy 
lockups once again raise concerns analogous to those we saw in the 
corporate context. Bankruptcy assures that the debtor's manage rs 
control the reorganization process, at least at the outset,85 and managers 
h ave many of the same incentives to further their own interests in  
bankruptcy as  they do when the firm is healthy. Likewise with the final 
factor: lockup compensation raises the same kinds of issues in 
bankruptcy as it does in corporate l aw. 
I do not mean to suggest that bankruptcy simply mirrors corporate 
l aw in all relevant respects . It  obvi ously does not. In an influential 
article,  Bruce Markell explores several of the most significant differences 
between b ankruptcy and nonbankruptcy sales.86 In Markel l ' s  view, 
these distinctions, together with managers' ability (which they also h ave 
outside of bankruptcy) to reduce bidders' due diligence costs by giving 
them additional information,  diminish the need to use lockups to induce 
bids.87 None of these considerations is  a substitute for lockups, h owever. 
Although bankruptcy may reduce bidders' costs and uncertainty to some 
these transactions from a n  ex post wealth maxim iza tion perspective. Roosevelt, supra note 29,  at 'H.  The 
o ther i mportan t  bankruptc;· lockup a rticles, each of which ado p ts an auction perspective, arc :Vfark F. 
Hcbbc l n ,  Com ment, The Economic Clwjor Judicia/Deference lo Break-up Fee Agreements in Bankruptcy, i 3 BA,'\1\.R. 
DEV.j. +75 ( 1 997) ;  Paul B .  L1ckey, Note, An Emj1iriazl Sun'')' and Proj){)SUi Bank:ruptC)' Code Section Conceming 
tJze Proprie!Y of Bidding Incentives in a BaJzi.TUptcy Sale ojAssets, 93 COLU�I. L. REV. 7 2 0  ( 1 993); B ruce A. Ma rke l l ,  
The Case Agaimt Break.Jfi Fees in  B(llzk:rujltcy, 66 A.M. BA:'-:1\.R. L J .  3 4 9  ( 1 992). 
85 .  The B a n k r u p tcy Code pcrm i Ls the deb tor's managers to continue ru n n i ng the business in 
bankruptcy, see, e.g. , Bankr u p tcy Code § 1 1 07 (establishing powers of "dcbwr i n  possess ion") , and the so­
called "exclusivity period" assures that the debtor's managers arc the on ly ones who can propose a 
reorganiza tion pbn for at least the fi rst 1 20 days of the case. Bankruptcy Code § 1121. 
86.  Among other th i ngs, Markell emphasizes that ban kru ptcy sales guarantee clear title to acquirors, 
whereas nonbankruptcy sales do not. See Ma rke l l ,  supra note 84, at 3 74.  
87 .  See id at 369-70.  
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exte nt,  sign ificant costs and risk remain, which suggests that l ockups can 
p l ay a valuable role in bankruptcy, as in corporate la\v .8e  
The most  recent bankrup tcy l ockup cases are characterized by a 
remarkable degree of confusion as to th e effects of l ockups. 89 Although 
much more thoughtful than most of the lockup cases , and p robably 
correct on the facts, the Third Circuit 's  important new decis ion in 
Calpine Cor,b. v.  O'Brien Em:ironmentrd Energy, Inc. 90  i l l ustrates some of  the 
p roblems with the case law. ln O 'Brien , the debtor initi ated a n  auction 
by contacting over 300 poten tial bidders, winnowing the l ist  to five , and 
then signing an agreement vvith Calpine that incl uded $4 mil l ion in 
bre akup fees. The bankrup tcy c o u rt postponed its decision whether to 
approve the lockup , then refused to enforce it after another bidder 
outbid C alpine. In  upholding the b ankruptcy court decision ,  the Third 
Circuit took a troublingly hostile stance toward bankruptcy l oc kups. 9 1  
The O)Brien opinion emphasizes, for i nstance, that  Calpin e  continued to 
bid,  even though i t  knew that i ts b reakup fee might be denied.92 Yet 
C alpine's continued bidding was entirely rational----more so, rathe r  than 
less so if the validity of its lockup was in doubt93-and tells us n othing 
about the question whether i ts lockup was desirable or pernicious. 
What might a better approach look l ike? Given the benefits of 
l ockups, courts should use the same reliance-based framework I 
defended earl ier as their starting point,  with appropriate modifications 
for bankrup tcy. Perhaps the most i mportant bankruptcy-specific factor 
is the n ature of  the bankruptcy court process with respect  to the 
88. A final poi nt  reinforces this conclusion: Marke l l 's skeptical account ofbankruptcy lockups seems 
to focus on managers who have already decided to seek a sale and bidders who are com m i ued to ma ki ng 
a bid .  As we saw i n  the corporate context,  lockups may entice managers to agree to a sale i n  the first 
instance, and they can be used to induce a bid from a bidder who might otherwise hesitate. For a s imi lar  
point ,  see Hebbeln, supra note 84,  at 497 (criticizing existing analysis because " i t  places too m uc h  emphasis 
on the role of break-up fees in encouraging (or discou raging) further bids . . .  and too l i ttle emphasis on the 
role break-up fees play i n  encouraging the i nit ial  bid"). 
89. Borrowing from Delaware corpor·atc law, several earlier cases appl ied a busi ness judgment rule 
analysis and upheld bankru p tcy lockups. See, e.g. , In re 995 Fifth Avenue A1sociates, L.P. , 96 B . R. 24, 28 
(Bankr. S .D.N.Y. 1 989); Official Commi ttee of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Resources, Inc. 
(In n: I n tegrated Resources, Inc.), 1 4 7  B.R. 650, 659-660 (S.D.N.Y. 1 992) .  These cases arc closer to the 
mark but  pre-date important de,·e lopments such as Delaware's decision in  Br��.<.en. 
90. 1 8 1  F.3d 527  (3d Cir. 1 999). 
9 I .  Like several of the other cases, O 'Bn.cn was i n n uenced by the insights offered by Bruce Markel l .  
1 8 1  F. 3d a t 535 (citing Marke l l ,  supra note 84); see also In re America West Ai rl ines ,  I n c . ,  1 66 B . R .  9 0 8 ,  9 1 2  
(Bankr.  D .  Ariz. 1 994) (" (T] his Court's opinion herein adopts and approves of the reasoning e n u me rated 
i n  the [Markel l) law review article ."). 
92.  O'Brien, 1 8 1  F.3d at 53 7. 
93 . Even if the lockup were enforceable, Calpine would ha\"C an incentive to keep bidding so long 
as i ts expected profits exceeded the value of" the lockup.  H val id i ty of the lockup \vere in  doubt, Calpine 
would discount  i ts  value and continue bidding so long as i ts expected profits exceeded the reduced ,·a l ue 
of the lockup.  
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transaction in question.  Sales of assets that do not involve the entire 
firm can be approved at a so-called section 363  hearing,94 whereas 
transactions that affect the reorganization as a whole must be put to a 
vote of all classes of creditors and shareholders .95 Because the section 
363 approach entails substantially l ess de lay than the firm-wide 
reo rganization vote, courts should be more restrictive in th e  reliance 
cos ts they allow in that  co nccxt.  Courts also should be somewhat 
st ingier about rel iance costs in cases l ike 0 -'Bnen, where the debtor 
ini tiated the auction and provided extensive information to the bidders .  
I t  i s  worth emphasizing that even if the bidder's reliance interest is 
re l atively l imited, this does not mean that the lockup in questio n  should 
be prohibited.  As in corporate law, the best approach is to limit,  but 
ge nerally permit, lockup arrangements (and to permit them for both first 
and second bidders) . 
II .  DELAWARE IN CORPORATE L-\W AND BA1'lKRUPTCY: CHARTER 
COMPETITION Al\l"D VENUE 
Part I explored a particular issue, the role of lockups i n  c hange of 
control transactions.  Given Delaware's p reeminence in corporate law, 
the analysis drew largely from Delaware cases. In this p art, we shift 
from specific doctrinal issues to Delaware itself. Delaware' s  success i n  
attracting corporations has long been controversial, a n d  h a s  p rompted 
periodic calls for reform .  
The first section o f  this part describes the corporate l aw debate, which 
pits defenders of Delaware against those who view Delaware's 
dominance i n  corporate law as pernicious. Although defenders of 
Delaware appear to h ave the upper hand,  as we shal l  see,  commentators 
also have identified areas where Delaware lawmaking m ay further 
i n te rests other than efficiency. 
The second section turns to bankruptcy. After decades in the 
shadows, Delaware has now become by far the most popular venue for 
large corporations that file for bankruptcy. Delaware 's sudden 
bankruptcy dominance has proven at least as controversial as the state 's  
role in corporate law; the debate over proposals to l imit  Delaware venue 
is now the s ingle hottest issue i n  corporate bankruptcy. In  an earlier 
artic le ,  I explained why the increasing number of Delaware filings is  a 
g,l. Bankruptcy Code § 363(b) requires court approval ,  afte r notice and a hearing, of any sale that 
is ouL>ide the ordina 1y course of business. 
95. See Bankruptcy Code § 1 1 2 9  (vote to confirm a reorgan ization plan) .  Both section 363 sales and 
the reorganization vote i ntroduce delay somewhat analogous to the d elay required for a shareholder vote 
o u ts ide of bankruptcy. Section 363 en wils less delay, whereas the reorganization vote may involve more. 
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cause more for celebration than for concern.06 In  this  artic le ,  I respond 
to seve ral subsequent commen tators who have chal lenged my analysis, 97 
and I expand and defend my earlier conclusions.  
Notice that my confidence about Delaware's  rol e in cOJvo rate law 
and bankruptcy has obvious implications for i t s  treatmen t  of part i cular 
issues such as l ockuos .  The same forces that cxolain Dehware 's  i ' 
dorn i n :tnce i n  c o m1 orate la\>' and bankruoccv su gg:es t  that  D < : L"l'.'<UT \v·i l i  J. ' '-- "-' 
devel oo a g-e nerally efTicient response to the locku1J iss ue · - D rc c isclv ! t._/ .. j. ; 
what we see in cases such as Brazen . 
A. Charter Competition and Delaware Corporate Laz.0 
Although Delaware's status as home base for most of  the nation's  
largest corporations dates back to the early decades of the twe n ti eth 
centu ry, Delaware was not first .  Before D elaware, New Jersey attracted 
numerous prominent corporations and drew the ire of reformers.'l8 It  
was the reformers '  ire ,  in a sense,  that led to New Jersey's demise .  Afte r 
New Jersey had long given l arge corporations significan t flexibili ty to 
e ngage in mergers and acquisitions,  vVoodrow Wilson, as governor, 
championed l e gislation that would subject these activities to searching 
antitrust review. Rather than submit to the n ew regime,  many of the 
nation's  largest corporations simply picked up shop and moved down 
the coast to D elaware . Delaware has been the l eadin g  state of 
incorporation, and an ongoing target of critics, ever since. 
I n  i ts modern incarnation, the debate over Delaware 's role i n  
corporate law dates back t o  a n  important 1 9 7 4 article b y  vVilliam Cary 
(who not coincidentally, had previously chaired the S e cu rit ies  and 
Exchange Commission,  which oversees the pri ncipal fideral l egis latio n  
governing corporate and securi ties law).99 Cary assumed that, although 
the decision whether to reincorporate in Delaware is subject  to a 
shareholder vote, the sharehol ders of large corporations are too widely 
scattered to make an informed decision .  A state that wishes to attrac t 
corporations must therefore cater to managers rather than s hareholders.  
As a result, states e ngage i n  a "race to the bottom," as t h e i r  effo rts to 
e ntice corvorations lead to more and more manager frie n dly laws. As 
96. See Skeel, supra note 8, at  24-33 (arguing that corpo r�\ lc !all" charter com peti t ion and De b,·are's 
corporate cu lwrc exert beneficial influence on Delaware bankrup tcv practice). 
9 7 .  Sc< Eisenberg & LoPucki, sujJra note 8, at 9 7 2 - 7 3  (auri b u ting Delaware popu lari ty to undesirable 
' � judge shoppi ng") 
98. Se<, e.g., Cn ristophcr G r:�ndv, New)asry CorjJoml< Chrzrlermongennx, ! 875- 1 9:29, · !9 J .  ECO:\. HIST. 
6 7 7  ( 1 989). 
99 .  See Cary, supm note 2 .  
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the leader in this competition, Delaware is more beholden to managers 
than any other s tate . The only solution, C ary believed, is to enact 
federal legislation that minimizes the pernicious effects of state charter 
competition.  1 00 
Several years later, Ralph vVin ter responded to Cary i n  an article that 
has inspired the " rac e  to the top" view of s tate charter competit ion . 1 0 1  
Even i f  managers rather than shareholders a re the real decision m akers, 
vVinter argued,  they will be penalized by the marke t(s) if they 
incorporate in a state whose laws are inefficiently lax and manager 
frie ndly. The managers of such firms will suffer in the p ro duct  marke ts 
(inefficient firms cannot p roduce their products as cheaply as efficient 
ones), the managerial labor markets (sloppy managers are l ess attractive 
to other firms), and the capital markets (investors will p ay less for the 
stock or debt of an inefficient firm) . Most important of all,  b ecause their 
stock p rice will be lower than that of firms in other states ,  firms that 
incorporate in inefficient states will  be much more vulnerable to 
takeover bids. In view of these market pressures, Winter concluded that 
managers have a po\verful incentive to seek, and states to provide,  
efficient rather than inefficient laws . Charter competition thus produces 
d h " , h "b , a race towar t e top, not t e ottom. 
Winter's principal successor in the literature, Roberta Romano, has 
developed and defended the race to the top view in a series of important 
articl es . 1 02 Romano emphasizes that Delaware's dependence on 
corporate law revenues acts as a commitment device.  Because nearly 
20% of the state's income comes from franchise taxes and other 
corporate law fees, Delaware lawmakers cannot afford to suddenly turn 
their backs on the interests of Delaware corporations. 103 When 
important new corporate law innovations emerge, Delaware is  always 
one of the first states to enact them. 
Along with its legislative responsiveness, Delaware also offers 
important benefits in the judicial sphere . Delaware's  judiciary i s  the 
most sophisticated in the nation on corporate law issues,  both because 
of Delaware 's  preeminence in corporate law and because Delaware 
channels corporate law issues to a special ized chancery court with direct 
appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. 1 04 Comp lementing this 
1 00. See irl. at 700-703 (proposing m i nimum federal standards in  corporate law). 
1 0 1 .  Winter, supra notc 7 .  
1 02 .  See, e.g., Robert.> Romano, The Strm Competition Debaie in Corporal£ Law, 8 CARDOZO L .  REV. 709 
( 1 987); Roberta Romano, Lnw as a Product Some Pieces ufik lncarpomtion Pu.::;Je, IJ.L. Eco...,.. & ORG. 225 
( 1 985) [he reinafter Romano, Law as Product) . These articles su bseq uently led to an influential book.  See 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GE:'\IUS OF A.�·1 ERICA;\ CORPORATE. L\ \\' ( 1 993). 
1 03 .  Set RO.v!At>O, supra note 1 02 ,  at  38. 
1 04. See id. �t  39-40 (Delaware j udiciary) .  
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expertise is an extensive and well-developed case l aw on corporate l aw 
issues.  Delaware also provides speed:  its judges routinely resolve 
sensitive issues in a matter of days, rather than months. 1 05 
O ther scholars have continued to criticize charter competi tion from 
Caty's "race to  the  bottom" perspective . Al though Lucian Bebchuk 
ackn owledges many of the virtues of D elavvare l awmaking, such as 
Dcla\varc 's  exp e rt j udi ciary, he argues that m arkcl forces do not  
e l iminate states ' incentive to  favor managers rather  than sharehol ders.  <..-
iVIarkets are a limited corrective , in his view, and do not preve n t  s tates 
from enacting provisions that,  for example ,  provide sig-n i ficant benefits 
to managers but do not undermine firm value en ough to trigger a 
. 1 06 m arket resuonse . . 
One of the most striking attributes of the current charter comp e tit ion 
debate is the broad range o f  agreement. All  of the p a rticipants 
acknowledge that D elaware offe rs i mportant benefits, and most (th o ugh 
not  all ,  as the p revious p aragraph suggests) incline more toward the race 
to the top than the race to the bottom view, 1 07 and new empirical 
evidence lends additional support to this view. 1 08 
IV1uch of the current l iterature focuses on the possibili ty that, even if 
charter competition is generally effective , Delaware 's l e ad is so 
commanding that it can afford to divert (at least some) value from 
shareholders to other beneficiaries. Although managers are o n e  possible 
beneficiary, several commentators have pointed out that Delaware l aw 
benefits the local bar. 1 09 Delaware has enacted a variety of rules that 
m ake i t  easy for the p arties to bring l itigation in D el aware , for i nstance , 
and its courts have been sympathetic to plaintiffs attorneys ' requests for 
l OS .  In her contr ibution to this symposium,Ji l l  Fisch explores the role of the Dclaware j ud icia1y in 
st i l l  greater detai l ,  and poin ts out  that Delaware's courts function much more l ike a legislatu re than do most 
coun.s. Suji l l  E. Fisch, 77ze Peculiar Role oftk Dela.ware Courts In tk Competition jilT Corporau Chart.ers, 6 8  U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1 06 1  (2000). 
I 06. Bebchuk has argued that markets wi l l  not correct inefficiencies with respect to issues that: 1 )  
involve significant redistribution to managers b u t  a more attenuated e ffect  on shareholders ;  2 )  d i rectly 
a fTec t  the effectiveness of  market discipline; or 3) have effects on t h i rd panics. Lucian A1yc Bebch u k, 
Federalism and tk Corporation: The Desirable Lin1i.Lr on Sui.le Competition in Corporau Law, l 05 HARV. L. REV. 1 435 
( 1 992); see aLro Lucian A1yc Bebchuk & Al len Ferrel l ,  Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race Ia  Protect A1ana.gen 
_(rom Takeovers, 99 COLLJM. L. REV. 1 1 68 ,  1 1 72 - 7 3  ( 1 999). 
Melvin Eisenberg also has defended the race to the bottom view. Eisenberg analogizes states' 
sol ic i tude fo r managers' i n terests to side payments made by a sel ler  !0 an agent. WIWAi\1 L. CARY & 
MELVl:\ A. EISE�BERG, CASES AND MATERIALS 0:\ CORPORATIONS (7th ed. 1 995). 
! 0 7 .  Su generally Bebchuk & Fe rre l l ,  supra note 1 06, at  1 1 69 ("Cary's skeptical view of state 
com petition has not been widely accepted by corpo rate law scholars."). 
1 08. Sa Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value.' (unpublished d raft, 1 999) (fi nding that 
Delaw:ue firms arc genera l ly  worth more than non-Delaware corporations). 
1 09.  This ,·iew is gene ra l l y  attributed to an i m portant  article bv Jon Macey and Geoff Mil ler. See 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Mil ler, Toward 1111 Interest-Croup Ilzeory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 469 ( 1 987). 
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compensation. 1 1 0 I n  an earl ier article,  I suggested that the surprising 
amount of uncertainty in the Delaware case law could be viewed i n  
similar terms : uncertainty b reeds litigation and thus the need for 
lawyers. 1 1 1  Interestingly, uncertainty b e nefits Delaware's lawyers in 
ano ther way as well .  Because the c ourts have developed vague,  fact  
sp ecific standards on important issues,  Delaware l a\'-')/Crs can represent 
cl i e n ts on e i ther side of the issue rath e r  than spec ial izing in a particular 
pcrspccuve . 
The benefi ts to local l awyers reflect,  it sh ould be emphasi z ed, at most 
a m i nor inefficiency of Delaware law· . l\!loreover, many of th e rules  in 
question can be seen as central to Delaware 's  role in corporate law. The 
Dela\vare j udiciary views itself as a moral arbiter on corporate lavv 
issues. 1 1 2 I t  is for this reason that so many Delaware cases include both 
a careful ,  fact  intensive assessment of the directors' performance, and 
general moral guidance for other boards of directors . In addition to 
calling for nuance rather than s imple rul es ,  the moral dimension of 
Delaware j udging also explains the c o u rts' need for a ste ady supply of 
cases-new cases provide additional opportunities for instructio n . 1 1 3 
Closely linked to Delaware j udges'  role as moral arbiter is another 
factor that the charter competition l iterature sometimes negl e c ts :  
Delaware's  corporate culture . Although D elaware's  judges are elected, 
they serve lengthy terms . 1 1 4 As a result ,  Delaware 's judges are less 
subject to political pressures, such as the state 's  dependence on charter 
revenues, than lawmakers are . In theory, Delaware judges could rebel 
against the state 's  traditional role in corporate law and chart a different 
course.  Yet Delaware 's  judges are steeped in l ocal corporate culture. 
The frequent, ongoing, informal contact between the D el aware bar 
(from which most of the judges come) and the j udiciary serves as a 
powerful constraint on defection from Delaware 's  traditional mission in 
I I  0. See id. at 494-97. 
I l l . Su Skeel, supra note 77, at 1 55- 1 6 2 .  See also Douglas M .  Branson, lnddenninacy: The Final 
Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis o[Corpora/.t Ltzw, 43 Vi\.,'\TI. L. REV. 85 ( 1 990). E h u d  Kam a r  has pointed 
out that uncertain ty can actually increase Delaware's advan tage by making it more di m c u l t  for other states 
to replicate Delaware's case law. See Ehud Kamar, A Regu!atmy Competition Thory oflndetenninacy in Corj;ortzle 
Ltzw, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 908 ( 1 998). 
1 1 2 .  See Skeel ,  supra note 7 7 ,  at 1 63-72 (desc ri b ing "moral d i mension" of De laware takeover cases). 
Ed Rock was one of th e  first to emphasize th is  aspec t of Delaware decision making, and has characterized 
Dt: lawan: 's fiduciary duty cases as "sermons" to the busi ness commu nity. See Edward B. Rock, Sainls and 
Sinners: How Does Delaware CorjJom/.t UIU> Work.', 4-1- UCL\ L. REV. I 009 ( 1 997); Edward B. Rock , Preaching 
to lv!tmrzgm, 1 7 J.  CORP. L. 605 ( 1 992) (re\' iewing LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, S£NS£ A1"1D N0i'\S£NSS IN 
CORPORATE FINAJ'\CE ( 1 99 1 )). 
1 1 3 .  See, e.g., Rock, SauzL> and Sinnm, supra note i 1 2 ,  at 1 097-99. 
1 1 4 .  I do not mean to suggest that Delaware j udgcs arc i m m une from political pressu r·es. Judges that 
offend Delaware norms a rc sometimes nm reappo i n ted, as And rew Moore discovered to his chagri n .  See 
generrzlly RO.\!A:\0, sujna note 1 02,  at  40 (d iscuss ing po l i t ica l accou n ta b i l i ty of Delaware j udges). 
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corporate law. The constraining, and shaping, effect of  D e l aware 
corporate culture wil l  prove especially important as this a rtic l e  crosses 
the line from corporate law back into b ankruptcy . 
B. Venue and Forum .Snapping in BankruptC)' 
Until  the !aLe 1 980s, Delaware p l ayed no mean ingful role i n  large 
scale corporate reorganization .  Because bankruptcy's venue provis ion 
p ermits corporate debtors to file  for bankruptcy in  the i r  state of 
incorporation,  most large corporate debtors could have taken their 
bankruptcy to Delaware . 1 1 5  Yet few firms took advantage o f  this op ti on . 
Then everything changed.  In the absence of a more attractive venue 
option, Continental Airlines filed for bankruptcy in D elaware in 1 990.  
The D elaware bankruptcy court's successful handling of Continental put 
D elaware on the bankruptcy map, and Delaware quickly displaced New 
York as the venue of choice for large scale reorganizatio n .  1 1 6 
Delaware's  rapid ascent p rompted a sharp backlash fro m  b ankruptcy 
professionals .  C ri tics grumbled that the Delaware b ankruptcy j u dges 
had cultivated too cozy a relationship with debtors and the l ocal 
b ankruptcy b ar, and insisted that Delaware's location was inconvenient 
for many creditors. In 1 997 ,  these critics persuaded the National  
Bankruptcy Review Commission to adopt a provision proposing to 
remove state of incorporation, and thus Delaware, fro m  a corporate 
debtor's choice of filing locations. 1 1 7  A similar prohibition has m ade its 
way into proposed bankruptcy l egislation, but i t  was subsequently 
removed. 
In an e arlier article,  I argued that the assault on Delaware is alm ost 
e n tirely misplaced. 1 1 8 Not only does much of the criticism stem fro m  
l i S . Under bankruptcy's venue provision, a corporate debtor can file for bankruptcy i n  the district 
of its "domicile"-which has been construed to be its s tate of incorporation; i ts principal place of busi ness; 
the location of i ts principal asse ts; or the location of a pending bankruptcy case involvin g  an afft l iate of the 
firm . 28 U.S.C.  § 1 408 ( 1 994). 
Fmm 1 938  u n t i l  the early 1 970s, corporate debtors were not permitted to usc state of 
incorporation as a basis fur bankruptcy venue. The dra fters of the Bankruptcy Rules rei n troduced state of 
incorporation as a ve nue option in 1 973 .  For a discussion of the history and its impl ications,  see Skee l ,  mjJrrl 
no te 3, at 8- 1 6. 
1 1 6. Fo r a good discussion, see Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing/Y!att.ers: Prumoting 
Fornm Slwf!Ping by Insolvent CorjJOrationr, Nw U . L. REV. (forthcoming, 2000); see alw Mark D .  Col l i ns, vVl!Y 
Delaware?, 1 5  DEl. .  L\W. 38 ( 1 997). 
1 1 7 .  For a more detai led overview of these events, see Skeel ,  supra note 8 ,  at 2 n.2, 2 1 ,  3 3-35 .  
1 1 8 .  I say "almost" because at least one criticism, the complaints about ex parte contacts between 
a D e l aware j udge and local attorneys, was well-rounded. I n  the race or widespread criticism or Delaware's 
bankruptcy court (although oste ns ibly for o ther reasons), the chiefj udge of the District Cou rt,J udgeJoscph 
Farnan, intervened in the assignment of D el<l\varc bankru ptcy cases. See i.t/. at 2 n . 2  (describing Farnan's 
"withdrawal of reference" of bankruptcy cases to the bank ru ptcy cou rt). 
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bankruptcy p rofessionals '  own interests, but permitting firms t o  file  in 
Delaware promises to transl ate many of the b enefits of state corporate 
law charter competition into the bankruptcy context. In fact, one could 
argue that firms should be forced to bring any bankruptcy petition in their 
f . · ' ' 9 Ifb k d f . · state o mcorporatJOn. an - ruptcy an state o mcorporatJOn went 
together, states would treat corporate bankruptcy as an extension of 
corporate l aw (as they should) , and they would compete by offering . . l 
rr: . 
b k l 1 20 mcreasmg y ea1c1ent an ·ruptcy ru cs. 
Existing law obscures the link between bankruptcy and corporate law 
in several important respects . First and most importantly, Congress 
rather than the states regulates bankruptcy l aw, so state lawmakers have 
much l ess influence on corporate bankruptcy than on general corporate 
law. Second, bankruptcy's venue provision gives most large firms a 
series of venue options at the time they file for bankruptcy. 1 2 1  Because 
they have complete control of the decision and can make their choice 
after the firm fails, corporate managers can shop for the most attractive 
courthouse at the time ofbankrup tcy. 
These factors clearly weaken the ties to corporate charter 
competition,  but important benefits remain.  While bankruptcy law is 
federal , it  defers to state law in numerous p arti culars, and even the 
federal framework can be applied differently in different locales. It  is 
p recisely this flexibility that has enabled the Delaware j udges to develop 
a distinctive approach to large cases. With respect to a manager's 
multiple  venue options, it is important to recognize that the choices are 
not unlimited. More importantly, the best solution would be to 
eliminate some or all of the other venue options . 1 22 This i s  the intuition 
behind Bob Rasmussen and Randall Thomas's proposal to p e rmit firms 
to select a bankruptcy venue by contract, 1 23 and it also might justify 
l imiting bankruptcy venue to a firm's state of incorporation. 1 2+  
! ! 9 .  See Ui. at 3 7-38. 
! 20.  I have argued elsewhere that Congress ideal ly would shift control of corporate bankruptcy back 
to the states, thus truly consolidating corporate law and corporate bankruptcy. See D avid A. Skeel, Jr . ,  
Retlzinking the Line Between Corporal.t Law am! Corpomu Bankruptcy, 7 2  T£X. L.  REV. 47 ! ( ! 994). Although such 
a move is politically unl ikely, Delaware venue can be seen as achieving a portion of i ts  benefits. 
! 2 ! .  See supra note 1 1 5  (listing the ve nue options). 
! 2 2 .  The most l ikely candidate for removal (or at the leas t, amendment) is the option to fik in a 
district where one of a firm's subsidiaries have fi led fm bankru ptcy. See Skeel,  supra note 8, at 40 n . l 2  \ .  
Firms can and do manipulate this option by f il ing for bankru ptcy i n  a district where a minor  subs id iary has 
its headquarters or pri ncipa l assets, and using t h is filing as the basis for venue for the rest of the f1 rm. !vlany 
of the firms that filed for ban kru ptcy in New York in the 1 980s used this basis for venue.  See, e.g., Lynn IV! . 
LoPucki & Wil liam C. Whi tford, Venue Choice and Fomm Shopping in tJze Bankn.tptcy Reorganizaiioll uj U1rge, 
Pu.blic{y Held Comprmus, 1 99 ! WiS. L. REV. I I , 2 2 ,  2 7 .  
1 23 .  See Rasmussen & Thomas, suprn note 1 ! 6 , a t  5 ! -59.  
1 2 4.  My own suspicion i s  that  basing bankru ptcy venue on a fi rm's ex a n te contractual cho ice, a s  
Rasmussen and Thomas propose, general ly would p roduce the same choices as a domici le-based approach .  
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Prohibiting fi rms from fil ing in  their state o f  incorporation is precisely 
the \·vrong solution. 
Delaware 's success as a bankruptcy forum strongly reinfo rces the 
theoretical attractions of bas ing venue on a deb tor ' s state of  
[nc orpo rati o n .  Almost a s  s o o n  a s  l arge fi rms started taking their  c ases 
w Dcla'.-vare, Delavvare developed a reputatio n for fast and efficient case 
adrT1inistratio n .  Large firms that  wish to propose p repackaged 
bankruptcies-reorganizations that are negoti ated an d  voted on before 
the deb tor files-almost alwavs look to Delaware, and Delaware also is 
the forum of choice for traditi
.
onal reorganizations . 1 25 Not surp ri si ngly, 
the characteristics that distinguish Delaware b ankruptcy c ases-speed 
and administrative efficiency, as \veil as sophistication-are quite similar 
to the reputation of D elaware ' s  state court j udges in high p rofile 
corporate l aw cases .  The same business culture that has long 
distinguished D elaware in corporate l aw now encompasses b oth 
corporate law and bankruptcy. 
A new article by Ted Eisenberg and Lynn LoPucki chal l enges many 
of my conclusions about Delaware and bankruptcy venue.  Three 
contentions l ie at the heart of their critique. First, Eisenberg and 
LoPucki question my contention that "bankruptcy law p ermits l ocal  
variation." Because "eve ry significant aspect of C hapter 1 1  
reorganization is" subject  to a uniform federal law, they b e lieve that 
" [ s J ignificant , persistent differences among bankruptcy courts . . .  should 
be impossible," and that bankruptcy debtors therefore shop only for 
j udges, not for bankruptcy courts . 1 26 Second, Eisenberg and LoPucki 
present empirical evidence on venue choice that seems to the m  to cast 
doubt on Delaware's reputation for quick and efficien t  b ankruptcy 
administration . 1 27 Third, they suggest that speed and efficiency cannot 
be the reason for Delaware 's prominence, because New York was 
corporate debtors' forum of choice before Delaware and New York does 
not p rocess cases more promptly than other couns. 1 28 Let me describe 
the problems with each of these arguments in turn . 1 29 
Nearh- ::dl smJ. l l  and medium-sized firms incorporate in the state where they are located, and these firms 
would choose the same state as the i r venue selection .  Llrge corporations usually incorporate either in their 
princi pal place ofbusiness or  in  Delaware, and most would p robably adopt a similar strategy for bankruptcy 
venue .  
1 25 .  See ge&Ta![y Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8 ,  at 979 (venue study finding that  82 .5% of large 
firms that "fo rum shopped" in bankruptcy between 1 994 and 1 997 fikd their  cases in Delaware). 
1 26 .  Eisenberg & LoPucki,  supra note 8, at 9 7 2 .  
j 2 7 .  See id. at 987-92. 
1 28 .  See i.d. at 996-97. 
1 29 .  Another problem with the Eisenberg and LoPucki analysis, as Rasmussen and Thomas point 
out, i:; th:ll i t  contains an internal tension . Eisenberg and LoPucki question whether Delaware tru ly acts 
more quickly than other ju risdictions, yet at the same time suggest that Delaware processes cases so fast that 
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The argument that a federal framework cannot b e  subj ect to local 
variation is in some respects the most puzzling, as it seems to assume a 
hyper-formalist definition of law. Suffice it to say that even if the 
Bankruptcy Code's rule-based sections are interpreted precisely the 
same in  every di strict, numerous bankruptcy provis io ns invite flexible 
apol ic ation and can be i n te rp reted difTe ren tlv bv diHerent c o urts . 1 30 In l I i 
addition, the Bankruptcy Code inco;vorates s tate law o n  rn any issues. 
Of particular note in this con text, bankruptcy courts often defe r  w the 
l aw of the state of incorporation on issues (such as fiduciary du ty) that 
i nvolve the internal affairs of a corporate debtor . 1 3 1  
D espite their insistence that bankruptcy law i s  federal and therefo re 
uniform, Eisenberg and LoPucki seem to assume the possibility of 
variation,  since they argue that corporate debtors shop for particular 
j u dges . 1 32 This shopping would not make sense, of course, unless 
different judges could i nterpret or apply the bankruptcy laws differently. 
The real question is whether the differences among districts are l ikely to 
b e  desirable or malignant. 
Second, Eisenberg and LoPucki question Delaware 's  reputation for 
speed and efficiency based on their findings that the differences between 
Delaware and other districts are not statistically significant.  Yet 
Eisenberg and LoPucki's skepticism does not follow very smoothly from 
their evidence. In fact, their evidence shows that Delaware does process 
both prepackaged and traditional cases more quickly than other 
districts, 1 33 and they concede in  a footnote that the difference migh t  well 
be statistically significan t if the number of cases were not so small . 1 34 
Moreover, it would b e  quite possible for Delaware to maintain a 
i t  may trammel on creditors' rights. See Rasmussen & Thomas, J11pra note 1 1 6 , at 44. 
1 30. In response to my suggestion that cou rts migh t develop di iTcrcnt approaches to issues such as 
postpetition financing and extensions of a debtor's exclusivity period, Eisenberg and LoPueki assert that 
the "Dclawan: bankruptcy court would be req uired to follow federal law on these matters." Id. at 972 n . l 8. 
Concerning postpctition credit, ! I U.S.  C. § 364 states the bankruptcy court "may" approve credit in  
various contexts, and 1 1  U.S .C .  § 1 1 2 1  (d) gives the  bankruptcy court discretion "for  cause [tO J reduce o r  
increase" the exclusivity period. By their own terms, these provisions obviously give courts a great deal of  
discretion in determining what i t  means to  "fol low federal law on these matters." 
1 3 1 .  See, e.g., Skeel ,  supra note 8,  at 29-3 1 (speculating about fu ture Delaware treatment of these 
issues). 
1 3 2 .  See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8,  at 9 7 2 - 7 3 .  l'vf y own view is that the earl ier popularity of 
New York may h:l':c reflected eiTorts to ob�1in a single judge, Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland, but that 
Delaware's prominence is broader, as I suggest below. 
1 33 .  See id. at 939 (mean duration of trad i tional cases in Delaware was 5 1 0  days, as compared tO 535 
days e lsewhere ; mean for Delaware prepackaged bankruptcies was 52 days, as compared to 59 days 
e l sewhere). 
i 3 't. Su id. at 99 1 n. 78 ("Having a high probabi l i ty of detecting a statistically s ignificant d i iTerence 
ol this size between Dclawat·e and other states . . .  requ i res a much larger popu lation of cases than is 
a\'a i lable. Thus, one should not take a fai lure to detect a significant di iTerence as firm evidence that no such 
d i lkrence exists.") 
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reputation for speed and efficiency even if other districts also processed 
cases quickly.  Delaware 's success in the 1 990s might have prompted 
o ther districts to improve their case administration,  for instance,  or 
corporate debtors may just have more confidence in D elavvare due to its 
longstanding prominence in corporate law. 
Third,  Eisenberg and LoPucki 's  comparison of New York and 
Delaware's  popul arity misunderstands my analysis in a subtle b u t  cmcial 
respect. I do not contend that venue shopping is  always eflicient, 
regardless of  i ts basis. 1 35 My argument, instead, is that basing the ve nue 
choice on a firm's  state of incorporation offers some of the same benefi ts 
fo r bankruptcy that i t  does for corporate law. The firms that ±ll e d  fo r 
bankruptcy in New York in the 1 9 80s were not incorporated i n  New 
York, and it is quite possible that this earl ier venue shopping was 
pernicious. (It is  also possible that firms filed in New York b ecause of 
the New York j udges' sophistication, and that Delaware displaced New 
York because it  offers both sophistication and speed) . 
I t  is interesting to note that D elaware's  continued prominence raises 
questions about Eisenberg and LoPucki's suggestion that debto rs 
invariably shop for judges rather  than districts. Eisenberg and LoPucki 
speculate that debtors sought out Judge Lifland i n  New York,  then 
shifted to Judge Balick in Delaware after New York adopted a truly 
random assignment system. 1 36 If this were strictly accurate, o n e  would 
not expect to find corporate debtors filing in Delaware now, since] udge 
B al ick retired several years ago and Delaware cases are currently  
handled by two bankruptcy judges and several district court j udges . 1 3 7 
The fact that Delaware remains firms' venue of choice is a tribute to the 
Delaware corporate culture, rather than simply a singl e  j udge . Nor is 
this confidence misplaced. D elaware 's current bankruptcy j udges have 
maintained the same reputation for speed and administrative efficiency 
asjudge Balick. 
The current venue system is  far from ideal . A better app roach would 
limit firm's venue options from the outset, rather  than giving the m  a 
! 3 5 .  Thus, when Eisenberg & LoPucki suggest that my "underlying prem ise-that fas t  is 
eflicien t ··· would suggest that New York's case processi ng was incflicicnt du ring the pe riod w h e n  New York 
was the venue of choice," id. a t 996-97,  I would agree that New York might have been i nefficient rather 
than co nc l ud ing, as they do, tha t neiih.er New York or Delaware tends toward cf1icicncy. 
! 36.  Sr.e it!. at 9 7 2 - 7 3  ("(T] h c  principal  purpose of forum shopping i s  w o b ta i n or a,·oid the 
assignment of panicuiar judges."); id. at 997 (suggesting that Delaware replaced New York as foru m of 
choice because " [o] ne n o  longer could be so confide n t  in  the chances of assign ment tojudge Lif1and in  New 
York, but one could be sure of assignment to judge Ba!ick in  Delaware"). 
1 3  7. Although Eisenberg & LoPucki's study suggests that the rate of venue shopping decreased i n  
1 99 7 ,  they p o i n t  out  that i t  "remains at  historically high levels" a n d  t h a t  "Delaware cu rrently dominates 
forum shopping to a degree that New York neve r has." /d. at 978-79. 
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choice a t  the time ofbankruptcy, as both I and Rasmussen and Thomas 
h ave proposed. But so long as the current approach remains, it is 
crucial that l awmakers include corporate domicile as a venue option.  
I I I .  CONCLUSION 
Th:s Article has focused on severai of the most pressing iss ues  in 
c o rp o rate law and bankruptcy, issues th a t have both theoretical and 
practical significance . \Vith lockups, I have argued that cou rts should 
enforce both first and second bidder lockups, but  sho uld l imit l ockup 
bidders to their reliance interest. This approach e n ables target 
managers to use lockups to induce bids and encourages them to accede 
to a change in control ,  bu t l imits the lockup 's  chilling effect on other 
bidders .  I have argued that courts should also apply a reliance-based 
approach in bankruptcy, rather than casting a cold eye on l ockups as 
recent bankruptcy cases h ave done.  
From lockups, the Article turned to the role of charter comp e tition in 
corporate law and b a nkruptcy. The analysis illustrated the l imitations 
of charter competition, i ts overall benefits ,  and the unique role that 
D elaware and i ts culture play in corporate l aw. The Article suggested 
that Delaware offers similar benefits in bankruptcy, and argued that the 
recent calls to bar corporate debtors from fil ing in Delaware are 
misguided.  
In an ideal world, corporate l aw and corporate bankruptcy would be 
connected. Although the two areas remain separate, our  discussion of 
lockups and charter competition i l lustrates just how much the distance 
between them has closed in  recent years . 
